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According to the FAA’s forecasts, air traffic growth will outpace infrastructure growth into 
the future.  Thus, the solution to this discord involves increased use of technology to 
enable more aircraft to use the existing airspace and infrastructure more efficiently.  
Automation levels and sophistication in transport category aircraft will only increase in the 
future as evidenced by the trend toward satellite-based navigation.  As automation 
technology has advanced, the role of the airline pilot has changed.  This paradigm shift is 
seeing pilots move from active participants in the flying duties of the aircraft to 
automation managers relegated to monitoring the automated systems.   
A possible consequence of this is increased levels of boredom in individual pilots due to 
the decreased involvement pilots have in the management of the flight.  Automation 
technology has improved to where the aircraft’s flight management systems can manage 
an entire flight from shortly after take-off to touchdown.  As automation increases so does 
the risk of automation complacency, defined as the pilot abdicating responsibility to the 
automation or failing to supervise it adequately.  The study examines whether a 
correlation exists between boredom and automation complacency practices.  Other 
research variables included type of operation (international versus domestic), longevity in 




The sample consisted of active professional airline pilots at a major airline as defined by 
revenue in the United States (N=273).  Each pilot completed a survey that included 
general demographic data, the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS), an automation 
complacency practices questionnaire, and some automation philosophy questions.  The 
survey also probed self-assessed boredom and frequency of attention lapses.  Pearson 
Correlation Coefficients allowed for a quantitative analysis between the variables, while 
the free comments section in the survey facilitated a qualitative examination of the issues 
and underlying causes. 
The results indicated a small but statistically significant positive correlation between 
boredom proneness and automation complacency practices (r=.181, p=0.01).  Other 
statistically significant positive correlations included self-assessed state boredom and 
frequency of attention lapses (r=.293, p=0.01).  The research has implications for 
employee selection, training methods, and operating procedures for individuals engaged 







Statement of the Problem 
Airline traffic will grow at extraordinary levels in the next decade.  In 2006, the airline 
industry flew 741 million passengers, which will increase to one billion annual passengers 
in 2015 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007).  All of these passengers will need to fly in 
new aircraft especially in the 70 to 90--seat size range meaning the industry will need a 
greater number of flight segments to carry these extra passengers. 
Unfortunately, the infrastructure required to handle the increasing amount of airplanes 
will not keep pace with the rapid traffic growth.  New infrastructure takes years to design, 
plan, and build while airlines can add capacity almost instantaneously.  Clearly, the 
aviation industry requires solutions.  If new infrastructure is politically or economically 
unfeasible then the solution requires using the existing infrastructure much more 
efficiently.  This is a trend already happening with the transition away from static land 
based navigation aids toward satellite based GPS systems for almost all functions of a flight 
including the arrival and approach phase (Kvalheim & Andersen, 2007).  Not only do 
these new types of approaches permit efficient use of airspace, they can accommodate 
curved paths to avoid terrain, increase traffic capacity, and reduce the impact on noise 
sensitive areas.  The most significant feature of these new RNP (Required Navigation 




management of entire flight from take-off to touchdown is self-contained within the 
aircraft’s automation systems.  The consequences of this trend is a substantial increase in 
the complexity and automation dependency since pilots are now relying on flight 
management systems (FMS) tasked with performing more functions that are critical.  With 
the increased emphasis now on automation to manage almost every phase of a flight, the 
aviation industry is experiencing some unintended consequences.  Perhaps the most 
significant consequence is the issue of automation complacency as it relates to the 
interface between pilots and the increasingly complex aircraft automation systems 
(Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Prinzel, Freeman, & Prinzel, 2005; Bailey & Scerbo, 
2008).  Finally, this is not a transitory issue nor can the industry afford the luxury of “de-
automating” aircraft in the future to remediate any complacency problems.  Technologies 
such as RNP remain the optimum method of helping solve aviation’s growing capacity and 
carbon emissions problems and will proliferate globally in the years to come (Kvalheim & 
Andersen, 2007). 
Automation “…refers to systems or methods in which many of the processes of 
production are automatically performed or controlled by autonomous machines or 
electronic devices” (Billings, 1997, p. 6-7).  Automation is silently prevalent in many 
aspects of everyday life, such as in electronic banking systems that operate transparently 
without any direct action from the user.  Electronic banking and similar types of systems 
are the autonomous devices referenced by Billings (1997) that require no user interface 




elevator starts a complex process where automated systems safely deliver the elevator car 
to the desired floor and open the doors when appropriate – all done silently to the user.  
Computer programmers develop these systems to operate efficiently by accurately 
executing narrowly defined set preprogrammed instructions.   
In aviation, aircraft automation is different in that it requires a high degree of monitoring 
by the user due to its dynamic nature (Billings, 1997).  The literature defines eight levels of 
automation ranging where the human operator must do everything to where the 
computer does everything ignoring the human (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2006).  The 
intermediate levels discussed by Sheridan et al. (2006) are most applicable to modern 
aviation, specifically the level where the automation “…executes the suggestion 
automatically, then necessarily informs the human” (pg 94).  This rubric tasks the human 
operator, in aviation’s case the pilot, with evaluating the computed suggestion and either 
stopping the automation or allowing it to continue.  In other words, the pilot is now 
required to provide mostly supervisory control over the automation versus manually 
computing functions such as vertical and lateral navigation.  Thus, the nature of the work 
an airline pilot performs has transitioned from one where the pilot is an active participant 
in controlling the aircraft to one where the pilot is an overseer of the automation.  As RNP 
and other efficiency enhancing technologies gain approval and reach, the speed and 




Purpose of the Study 
Prior to modern automation, the pilots were responsible for managing all aspects of the 
aircraft and the flight.  Early jet transport aircraft such as the Boeing 727 and early versions 
of the 747 included a flight engineer as part of the crew.  Some versions of the Boeing 707 
included a flight navigator to assist the flying pilots with lateral navigation.  The flight 
engineer responsibilities mainly comprised of managing the aircraft’s various systems.  In 
that role, he or she manually opened and closed valves along with functions such as fuel 
cross feeding.  The flying pilots had very limited flight management (FMS) systems 
especially in contrast to modern jets.  The automation available on these pre FMS 
airplanes often consisted of a rudimentary autopilot capable of only basic functions such 
as heading, altitude, and pitch hold along with basic navigation abilities.  The net result is 
the nature of the pilot position in a non-FMS aircraft is very different from the position in a 
modern automated aircraft.  The pilots who flew these aircraft were much more involved 
in the physical operation of the aircraft and thus not subject to the same amount of 
monitoring tasks a modern pilot is.   
For example, calculating a “top of descent” point involved manual math using a prescribed 
formula along with any experience derived “rules of thumb” by the pilot.  Once the pilot 
calculated this point, at the appropriate time he or she manually adjusted the aircraft’s 
flight trajectory to meet any altitude crossing restrictions.  Contrast this to a modern jet 
where the FMS calculates the “top of descent” point very accurately and accounts for 




pilot has correctly programmed the automation, the airplane will start a descent to meet 
any altitude restrictions often without input from the pilot.   
Once again, there are unintended consequences with advanced automation.  With their 
role increasingly becoming monitors of the flight instead of active participants, pilots may 
experience higher rates of boredom.  Boredom is commonly defined by psychologists as 
“…a state of relatively low arousal and dissatisfaction, which is attributed to an 
inadequately stimulating situation” (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993).  Recent evidence 
suggests there are correlations between workload, complacency potential and boredom 
proneness (Stark & Scerbo, 1998 as cited in Prinzel, DeVries, Freeman, & Milulka, 2001).  
Further, research shows a considerable link between boredom and the vigilance tasks 
necessary to perform the duties of supervising automation (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995; Warm, 
Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008).  Research also suggests boredom may affect the 
propensity for attention lapses (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006).  The authors of many 
of these studies linking boredom to the complacency, vigilance tasks, and attention issues 
inherent in automation complacency examined individuals in laboratory settings using 
psychometric tests or a form of desktop simulator.  Thus, the purpose of the study is to 
determine whether modern airlines pilots who are more prone to boredom, and thus 
more likely to experience the state of boredom, are more likely to perform automation 
complacency related actions or have attention lapses in a setting representative of the 




Significance of the Study 
There are increasing numbers of NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports 
that demonstrate the increasing nature of pilot overconfidence incidents (Research 
Integrations, 2007).  The data compiled by Research Integrations (2007) indicate that of 
the 890 incident reports they analyzed, 22% were attributable to automation 
complacency.  This issue tied “unexpected automation behavior” for first place as the 
greatest systemic problem facing pilots.  Therefore, if there is a correlation between 
boredom proneness and automation complacency, it will indicate that boredom is 
another factor that influences automation behavior.  Persons with increased boredom 
proneness are also more likely to experience attention lapses (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 
2006).  If the data shows a correlation between boredom proneness and the issues of 
automation complacency and attention lapses, the industry can devise new procedures 
and training emphasis areas that can help mitigate these two issues. 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
The advent of modern avionics and sophisticated Flight Management Computers has 
removed pilots from the direct actions of controlling the aircraft in certain phases of flight.  
Instead, the automation relegates pilots to systems monitors, a task that requires vigilance, 
trust, and supervision of the automation.  This in turn may increase the amount of 
boredom a pilot experiences, which may subsequently increase the rate of automation 
complacency related errors and attention lapses.  The null hypothesis is that pilots who fly 




automation complacency related practices and experience the same attention lapses as a 
pilot not prone to boredom. 
Research Questions 
1. Are pilots who are more prone to boredom more or less likely to commit an 
automation complacency related behavior? 
2. Are pilots who have flown their current airplane for greater than four years more or 
less likely to commit an automation complacency related behavior than a pilot with 
less than four years experience? 
3. Are pilots who are more prone to boredom more or less likely to have a self-reported 
attention lapse? 
4. Do pilots who fly wide-body aircraft in international operations self-report higher 
rates of boredom?  If so, does this cause them to make increased amounts of 
automation complacency mistakes? 
Conceptual Framework 
The fieldwork comprised of a four-part quantitative and qualitative survey.  The first 
section in the survey asked for basic demographic data such as age group, type of flying, 
gender, and longevity on the current airplane.  The second section administered the 
Experience of Activities test, commonly known as the Boredom Proneness Scale, or BPS 
(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986).  The third section administered the automation complacency 
questionnaire based on data derived from the NASA ASRS program.  The final section at 




along with automation philosophy.  The Boredom Proneness Scale utilized a 7-point Likert 
scale while the complacency test employed a 6-point scale.  Several questions provided 
participants to enter qualitative comments regarding their individual practices.  Survey 
participants were all experienced airline pilots from a major airline in the United States 
who have undergone an initial and recurrent training regimen that is representative of the 
American airline industry as a whole.   
Existing research positively associates length of job tenure with boredom due to repeated 
exposure to monotonous tasks (Drory, 1982; Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 2001).  If the 
first hypothesis is correct then pilots who are more prone to boredom will commit a 
greater number of automation complacency related mistakes.  Therefore, pilots who have 
been flying their respective airplane continuously for over 4 years should experience 
higher states of boredom and thus commit greater complacency related automation 
behaviors.  The study will test this hypothesis. 
Two studies associate boredom with lapses in attention suggesting individuals who are 
prone to boredom will experience an absent-minded event (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 
2006; Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008).  In aviation, lapses in attention or absent-
mindedness could have adverse consequences regarding flight safety.  Therefore, the 
study will determine if pilots who are more prone to boredom and thus more likely to be 
bored experience a greater number of attention lapses or absent minded behavior than is 




Finally, the pilots’ surveyed self delineated the majority of their flying as either “narrow-
body domestic (including Canada and Mexico)” or “wide-body international (including 
Hawaii)” primarily based on the predominant length of their trips.  The difference is 
significant, since narrow-body pilots (Airbus A320, Boeing 737 and 757) fly shorter 
segments with frequently more take-offs and landings, which are high workload actions 
and thus more stimulating.  Wide-body pilots (Boeing 747, 767, and 777) perform fewer 
take-off and landings instead spending a greater amount of time in the cruise phase with 
relatively lower levels of arousal and stimulation.  According to the definition of boredom 
posited by Mikulas et al. (1993), wide-body pilots are more likely to experience the state 
of boredom.  The study will test this hypothesis. 
Assumptions 
1. Participants are current 14 CFR Part 121 pilots employed by a major airline in the 
United States. 
2. Participants are graduates from the airline’s training curriculum and are current and 
qualified in their respective airplane. 
3. Each participant has at least one year of experience in a highly automated transport 
category aircraft, specifically the Airbus A320/A319, Boeing 737-300/500, 747-400, 
757-200, 767-300, or the 777-200 series aircraft. 
4. Participants honestly answered the automation section based on their aggregate flight 
experiences. 





1. The study relied on the honesty of each survey participant when answering questions.  
Although the survey instructions emphasized anonymity and the need for truthfulness, 
there is no way to gage how honestly each participant answered a question. 
2. The survey did not delineate aircraft type or automation behaviors specific to a 
particular aircraft.   
3. The study used participants of only one particular major airline. 
4. The study used participants who have graduated from the same airline training facility 
meaning consistency in exposure to the same automation philosophies and training 
emphasis points. 
5. Some of the automation complacency behaviors surveyed are training or operation 
emphasis items.  Therefore, pilots may be aware of the behavior and their 
consequences prior to the survey. 
Definitions 
 ATC – Air Traffic Control.  The government agency that directs and controls air traffic. 
 Automation Mode – The state of the automation, or what action the autopilot is 
currently performing. 
 Auto-thrust – The aircraft system that automatically manages the engine thrust to 
maintain a desired speed. 
 “Behind the airplane” – A colloquialism used by pilots to indicate events are 




 Flight Director – A visual tool present on the primary attitude indicator that provides 
guidance regarding control inputs to maintain a desired state. 
 FMC/FMS – Flight Management Computer or System.  The primary interface 
computer that manages all aspects of the aircraft’s performance, lateral and vertical 
navigation, and fuel calculations. 
 “Navable” – A colloquialism used by pilots to indicate that a departure utilizing land-
based navigation aids can be navigated exclusively within the aircraft using the FMS. 
 Raw-data – Information presented to the pilot in its raw or non-automated form. 
 SID – Standard Instrument Departure.  A routing assigned to pilots to facilitate the 
flow of traffic away from an airport. 
 STAR – Standard Terminal Arrival Route.  A routing assigned to pilots to facilitate the 
flow of traffic into an airport. 
 Waypoint – A navigational fix that the aircraft uses to fly toward as part of the course. 
 ILS – Instrument Landing System.  A system that provides lateral and vertical guidance 
toward the runway threshold in poor visibility situations.  It is comprised of two 
systems: 
o Localizer, or LOC – The ILS system that provides lateral guidance. 
o Glide-slope, or GS – The ILS system that provides vertical guidance. 
 VNAV – Vertical Navigation.  The automated mode that manages a descent to meet 






Because of the increasingly supervisory role of a modern airline pilot, that pilot’s main task 
is the passive act of monitoring the automation – a role that can lead to complacency 
(Billings, 1997).  Automation complacency results when the operator over relies or 
excessively trusts the automation and fails to exercise his or her vigilance or supervisory 
duties (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  In other words, “Pilots may become complacent 
because they are overconfident in and uncritical of automation, and fail to exercise 
appropriate vigilance, sometimes to the extent of abdicating responsibility to it [which 
can] lead to unsafe conditions” (Research Integrations. Inc, 2007).  The NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) publication Callback defines complacency throughout 
multiple issues as “…the state of self-satisfaction that is often coupled with unawareness of 
impending trouble” (Aviation Safety Reporting System, 2009).  The definitions quoted 
clearly imply that complacency occurs when the automation supervisor is unaware of the 
current or impending actions of the machine, which can have tragic results.  Automation 
complacency has led to several crashes with fatal results most notably in 1995 when an 
American Airlines crew flying a Boeing 757 into Colombia did not notice the aircraft’s 
automation activity resulting in tragedy (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia, 
1996).  The autopilot began to navigate toward the incorrect navigation fix, and 




One of the first studies on complacency involved simulated Air Traffic Control tasks both 
with and without an automated aid (Thackray & Touchstone, 1989).  The researchers set 
up a head-on collision scenario and offered half the participants the benefit of an 
automated aid that gave erroneous information at predetermined points.  The authors 
reasoned complacency should be evident due to the reliable nature of the automated aid, 
and that participants using the automation would become dependent upon it and 
therefore make more mistakes when given incorrect guidance.  However, in their analysis 
they found that both the non-automated and the automated group performed equally 
well in the task.  They explained the result was due to the short duration of the 
experiment and its single task nature that did not allow the operator to gain the necessary 
dependence and trust in the automation required for complacency. 
The next step involved a study that tested subjects in multi-task environment very similar 
to a modern aircraft flight deck (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993).  The authors 
examined the nature of complacency related ASRS reports and hypothesized that 
complacency is most evident when pilots are performing concurrent tasks such as 
simultaneously managing and monitoring the automation.  They argued that the two most 
important elements of an automated system, its reliability and consistency, most directly 
influences how the operator is able to detect and respond to failures.  Reliability refers to 
how often the automation works correctly, whereas consistency refers to the exact and 
predictable point where the automation fails.  The increased workload nature of the 




method of coping with the increase in workload (Elin Bahner, Huper, & Manzey, 2008).  If 
the operator perceives the automation to be consistent and reliable, then he or she needs 
to allocate fewer cognitive resources to the monitoring aspect.  In other words, the user 
“assumes” the automation will work just as it has in the past and subsequently focuses on 
other tasks in the multi-task environment.  Important to note is the workload threshold 
required for complacency is subjective, and varies between operators.  How each 
operator perceives his or her individual cognitive load determines both the response 
strategy and how they allocate mental resources to cope with the situation (Prinzel, 
DeVries, Freeman, & Milulka, 2001). 
In their study, Parasuraman et al. (1993) focused on the two variables of reliability and 
consistency in the complacency equation.  The research assigned participants into one of 
three groups all of whom performed an automation-monitoring task on a desktop 
simulator.  The first group had a low automation reliability level, the second group a high 
reliability level, and the third a variable level that alternated between high and low and 
specific points in the task.  Subjects in the variable reliability group performed significantly 
poorer that the other two, leading the authors to conclude that machine performance 
consistency was the major factor in determining complacency levels over operating 
reliability.  Stated differently, automation users who are accustomed to the automation in 
abnormal ways at known times can increase their monitoring at those points.  However, 
when the automation behaves inconsistently detection performance drops leading to a 




subjects trusting the automation to perform in a particular way based on their 
assumptions regarding its reliability.  Thus, a key element to the issue of complacency is 
operator trust.  This construct allows the user to reallocate attentional resources away 
from close monitoring duties toward other activities thus decreasing the chances of 
detecting an automation abnormality. 
Trust 
A good definition of trust is “…the attitude that…will help achieve an individual’s goals in 
a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability” (Lee & See, 2004, p. 54).  
According to this definition, the amount of trust guides the level of automation usage 
when the complexity or uncertainties of the situation make a complete understanding of 
the nuances of automation impractical.  In other words, trust allows users to make 
inferences regarding how the automation will perform when neither time nor a complete 
understanding of the event is present.  The amount of trust an operator has in the 
automated system depends heavily on the perceived reliability of the system in question 
(Prinzel, DeVries, Freeman, & Milulka, 2001; Lee & See, 2004; Bailey & Scerbo, 2008).   
High levels of automation reliability and consistency tend to impart greater levels of trust 
in the operator, which he or she can then use as a coping mechanism.  Rather than 
continue with the task of monitoring the automation, automation users can make 
assumptions on what the automation will do and concentrate on other duties.  This 
technique allows automation operators to allocate cognitive resources to other places or 




concept, Bailey et al. (2008) gave their subjects a flight task on a desktop simulator while 
simultaneously monitoring several displays for a single failure.  The researchers repeated 
their experiment several times with the failure occurring in different places.  Their results 
suggested that as the subjects gained experienced with the overall system, their 
monitoring performance decreased directly related to the level of familiarity and trust 
they had in the automation.  The researchers manipulated the system reliability thus 
altering the amount of trust each operator had in the predictability of the machine.  From 
this data, they could prove a direct relationship between the levels of trust and degraded 
monitoring performance.  Their subjects also had difficulty detecting minute changes, 
further suggesting that recognizing complex or subtle patterns are difficult.  The level of 
trust the operator places in the machine particularly in multiple task environments, 
however, is most directly responsible for the level of monitoring or oversight the user 
places on it (Lee & See, 2004).  
Along with perceived reliability, one of the major factors in determining the level of trust 
an operator places in the machinery is the risk involved with a particular action (Riley, 
1996; Lee & See, 2004).  The consequence of an action or inaction directly influences how 
the much emphasis the operator places on the vigilance task associated with proper 
automation monitoring.  The concept of risk tends to negate the influence of perceived 
reliability in the automated system.  Operators conducting a task with a greater risk will 
monitor the automation with greater accuracy regardless of how much confidence or trust 




on automation complacency.  Previous research on complacency involved subjects 
performing automation monitoring tasks on static simulators where the consequences of a 
complacency error are extremely low.  Riley (1996) argued that this research may not be 
indicative of “real world” applications since errors of omission and commission are often 
related to the seriousness of the potential outcomes.  The introduction of risk may 
generate a new set of biases and emphasis points that directly affect a monitoring task.  
Therefore, perceived risk of an automated action does have an effect on whether a user 
will commit a complacency related action.   
Another determinate of the trust level involves the perceived robustness of a system 
(Sheridan 1988, as cited in Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2006).  The operator determines this 
perceived robustness by how well he or she views the automation as a tool that can 
perform under various circumstances.  There needs to be a sense of familiarity of the 
machine in the user where the automation utilizes a set of predicable and familiar actions, 
terms, and displays.  All of these traits directly affect the mental model the operator 
creates of the automated system especially regarding its future actions.  Further, the 
operator needs to have a level of dependence on the automated system and view it as a 
useful tool necessary to complete the mission.   
When operators violate these concepts and do not use or monitor the automation 
properly, the result is often the misuse, disuse, and abuse of the automation (Parasuraman 




general theme of automation complacency.  Misuse results from the overreliance of the 
operator in the automation system and thus do not notice failures or exercise proper 
vigilance.  Automation disuse refers to an operator rejecting the capabilities of the 
automation commonly caused by items such as false alarms.  This results in errors of 
omission where the operator abdicates vigilance of the automation in favor of some other 
technique that may not be as effective in accomplishing the goal of automation 
supervision.  In both of these cases, the user neglects the concept of vigilance, which is a 
key component to the monitoring task associated with automation. 
Vigilance 
The term vigilance commonly refers to the ability of an individual to maintain his or her 
attention for long and interrupted periods (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995).  This ability is 
particularly important given the “monitoring” aspect to a pilot’s job.  Since automation 
now manages an increasing number of functions during a flight, vigilance becomes 
important at detecting subtle mode changes.  Bailey et al. (2008) determined that 
vigilance performance varied directly with the complexity of the task.  The more complex 
the task is, the greater the amount of monitoring errors they found in their sample once 
again suggesting that the trust and reliance constructs is a coping mechanism.  The more 
cognitively demanding a task is, the more the user is likely to “load shed” and assume the 
correct action of the automation rather than use resources to monitor it.  More 
importantly, the vigilance performance decreased even more if the inflection or change is 




programming is more difficult if there are no highlighting or warning systems.  Bailey et al. 
(2008) concluded, “…the impact of highly reliable automation on monitoring 
performance suggests that operator detection of complex or subtle patterns is incredibly 
difficult” (pg 345).   
Conventional theories by psychologists regarding reasons why vigilance performance 
decreases have centered on the monotonous nature of the activity.  The monotony 
supposedly lulled the operator into a decreased state of vigilance through a lack of 
stimulation.  However, new research has offered alternate theories for the performance 
decrement, instead arguing that vigilance is a demanding task associated with high levels 
of stress and concentration and not related to monotony (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995; Warm, 
Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008).  The reasons for this are complex.  Typically, the 
research has found that the need to maintain high levels of vigilance for extended periods 
substantially increases the operator’s workload increasing the amount of stress (Hancock 
& Warm, 1989).  In addition, a perceived lack of control over future events magnifies the 
stress factor in vigilance tasks.  As the vigilance task extends, the stress and perceived lack 
of control tend to deplete cognitive resources and contribute to a feeling of 
dissatisfaction (Warm, Dember, & Hancock, 1996).  Thus, the stress of vigilance may be a 
cognitive reaction to a lack of control and to the perceived pressure to maintain high 
levels of accurate monitoring.  The stress results in what cognitive scientists call the 
performance decrement, where vigilance performance in high workload situations can 




significantly lower level within 25 to 30 minutes (see Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 
2008, for a complete review).  One of the factors that directly affect vigilance 
performance is boredom (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995; Kass, Vodanovich, Stanny, & Taylor, 
2001).  In addition, Prinzel et al. (2001) found boredom a contributing factor in the 
general issue of automation complacency, of which vigilance is a major element.  Kass et al. 
(2001) found that subjects with high scores on the Boredom Proneness Scale (discussed 
later in the review) experienced a performance decrement much sooner than less 
boredom prone subjects.  They attributed this finding to the monotonous and under 
stimulating nature involved in vigilance tasks – concepts that directly contribute to 
boredom (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995).  In summary, the performance decrement found in 
vigilance tasks is attributable to the stressful nature of the task itself, while the speed of 
onset depends on how prone to boredom a person is.   
Boredom 
As previously stated, boredom is commonly defined “…as a state of low arousal and 
dissatisfaction attributed to an inadequately stimulating situation” (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 
1993).  Another definition adds the concepts of interest and attention.  Fisher (1993) 
defined boredom as “…an unpleasant, transient affective state in which the individual 
feels a pervasive lack of interest in and difficulty concentrating on the current activity” (pg 
396).  The term “state” refers to a transitory period of consciousness that affects how a 
person views the world around them.  For example, a person in a situation that meets the 




dissatisfaction, inadequate stimulation, lack of interest, and difficulty concentrating may 
experience boredom.  Due to its transitory nature, the “state” of boredom is temporary 
meaning when one or more of the conditions are resolved the person is, by definition, no 
longer bored.  Boredom proneness by contrast, is a trait referring the propensity of an 
individual to become bored (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986).  Individuals who are more prone 
to boredom may need lower arousal, dissatisfaction, and stimulation thresholds to 
experience the state of boredom than a person who is not as prone to boredom.  This 
review examines the connection between state and trait boredom later. 
Recent theories on how people respond to arousal suggest individuals will seek out ways 
to cope with various stimulation levels in order to maintain the optimum arousal level 
(Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993).  The associated cognitive performance required to sustain 
a task closely correlates to arousal and performance chart according to the Yerkes-
Dodson principle (in Staal, 2004).  This principle states that performance increases with 
arousal until it reaches a peak and then drops quickly.  If a person is in a situation with low 
arousal resulting in boredom, he or she is likely to seek ways to increase the arousal and 
avoid the boredom suggesting people will develop coping mechanisms to counter the low 
arousal (Fisher, 1993).  Conversely, if the arousal is too high, a person may seek ways to 
reduce the level before the corresponding performance level drops substantially.  The 
perceived complexity of a particular situation is an important concept since people 
respond to stress and arousal according to their abilities.  What may be an uncomplicated 




individuals results in part from situations whose complexity is too low for that specific 
individual resulting in below optimum arousal levels (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993). 
The second element of the definition, dissatisfaction, refers to an individual’s perception 
of the action.  For a person to be in a state of boredom he or she must not enjoy the 
particular situation they are in (O'Hanlon, 1981).  A person who is meditating may be in a 
low state of arousal but may not be bored if they are satisfied with the activity.  O’Hanlon 
(1981) reasoned the cause of this dissatisfaction is a person’s “…aversion to monotonous 
elements of the situation [that are]…the source of the feeling” (pg 54).  Thus, people 
have a natural aversion to monotony, which causes a person to feel dissatisfied with his or 
her current situation.  O’Hanlon (1981) found boredom and job dissatisfaction strongly 
related. 
The final component of the definition deals with inadequately stimulating situations.  This 
concept is unique to each individual and depends on the individual’s perception of the 
task.  A person’s assessment of how stimulating a task is depends heavily on any prior 
experiences with performing that task.  O’Hanlon (1981) posited that monotony might be 
a driving factor in a person being bored.  His work described the onset of boredom 
arriving within minutes especially if the person is engaged in a repetitive activity that he or 
she has done extensively in the past.  Repetitive activities lose their complexity after 
continuous practice and fail to provide the level of arousal necessary to be stimulating.  




boredom suggesting people exposed to the same job stimuli over time experienced 
higher boredom levels (Drory, 1982; Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 2001).  Drory (1982) 
experimented on long haul truck drivers, and found significantly increased levels of 
boredom in drivers who had driven the same route repetitively.  Kass et al. (2001) 
summed up the concept when they wrote “…repeated exposure to the same stimuli (e.g. , 
job tasks) leads to lower levels of arousal, which results in less satisfaction and greater 
boredom” (p 324).  Therefore, for a person to stave off boredom there needs to be a 
source of stimulation either from the current environment or from somewhere else.   
The etiology of boredom can be isolated into five factors (discussed later in the review).  
In work environments, the most common factors are the need for stimulation from 
external sources and stimulation through internal methods (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; 
Vodanovich, Craig, & Kass, 2005).  External stimulation refers to the perceived need for 
novelty, excitement, and variety from external sources and may explain why men and 
extroverts are more prone to boredom (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Vodanovich, Weddle, 
& Piotrowski, 1997; Gosline, 2007).  These population groups tend to require more 
external stimulation than internal.  The other major factor, internal stimulation, deals with 
methods to keep oneself interested and entertained through internal mediums.  Subjects 
who are dependent on internal stimulation need to be proficient at concentrating on and 
maintaining self-created tasks and often possess better absorption and self-awareness 
levels (Seib & Vodanovich, 1998).  These elements are often associated with introverted 




on working conditions suggest extroverted individuals who are more prone to boredom 
are best suited for opportunities that offer external and tangible rewards, while 
introverted people who are less prone to boredom are better suited to positions that 
offer intrinsic rewards (Vodanovich, Weddle, & Piotrowski, 1997).   
Important to note is that all three elements of the definition, low arousal, dissatisfaction, 
and inadequate stimulation, depend heavily on the individual’s perception of the situation 
regardless of the actual events taking place (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993).  An individual’s 
propensity to experience the state of boredom varies depending on their individual 
environmental situation and may be transitory.  Thus getting an accurate measure of 
boredom is difficult given the variety of perceptional differences between people and the 
transitory nature of the construct.  What is boring to one person may not be to another, 
and what is not boring today may be tomorrow.  However, the best method of 
quantifying boredom for research purposes is by measuring an individual’s proneness to 
boredom that in turn can help predict a number of personality constructs a person is 
likely to experience (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Vodanovich, 2003).  The most widely 
used tool is the Boredom Proneness Scale by Farmer and Sundberg (1986), and is a full-
scale measure of the boredom construct.  Other boredom indicators tend to analyze only 
specific aspects to boredom such as job boredom or are subscales of larger boredom 





In 1986, Farmer and Sundberg developed the Experience of Activities scale, commonly 
known as the Boredom Proneness Scale or BPS.  The original test included 28 true/false 
questions that asked subjects to self-assess their general attitudes toward situations and 
constructs commonly associated with boredom.  Farmer and Sundberg (1986) 
determined the internal consistency to be satisfactory (α=.79) using 233 college 
undergraduates as their sample.  In addition, they found the test has shown good test-
retest reliability (r=.83) after one week with greater stability demonstrated by females 
(r=.88) than by males (r=.74).  Using another sample Farmer et al. (1986) found a strong 
correlation between the BPS and a boredom self-assessment questionnaire (r=.67, 
p<.001) suggesting that the BPS bears a close association with  people willing to label 
themselves as bored, uninterested, or unsatisfied in their personal activities.  Their other 
validating study using college students in a pseudo-lecture found the BPS correlated 
closely with attention (r=-.29, p<.05) and lack of interest (r=.25, p<.05). 
Their original test used a true/false format that some researchers began changing to a 7-
point Likert scale to increase the measurement sensitivity (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990).  The 
work by Vodanovich et al. (1990) is particularly significant since it established a factor 
structure within the BPS scale allowing researchers to isolate what dimension is causing the 
boredom.  For instance, if two people have the same total score on the BPS, the factorial 
approach will allow researchers to isolate what specific deficiency is causing the boredom.  




Vodanovich et al. (1990) found evidence of three more factors: Affective Responses, 
which deal with emotional reactions to boredom, Perception of Time dealing with issues 
associated with the coping and conceptualizing of time, and finally Constraint, which 
addressed individual reactions to waiting such as restlessness or patience.  As an example, 
a high score on the following BPS question, “I find it easy to entertain myself,” indicates the 
subject responds better to internal stimulation.  A high score on the “Many things I have to 
do are repetitive and monotonous” question indicates an Affective Response, or an 
emotional reaction to boredom.  Other researchers have found similar factors 
incorporated in the BPS (see Vodanovich, 2003, for a review).  However, the consensus 
amongst the literature finds the two most common and dominant factors are the need for 
External Stimulation and Internal Stimulation (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Vodanovich, 
Weddle, & Piotrowski, 1997; Gordon, Wilkinson, McGown, & Javanoska, 1997; 
Vodanovich, Craig, & Kass, 2005).   
State versus Trait Boredom 
Research examining a correlation between trait and state boredom has centered on 
measuring job satisfaction metrics (Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 2001) and by 
correlating the BPS with other job boredom scales that measure state boredom (Farmer & 
Sundberg, 1986).  In their original work, Farmer et al. (1986) found the BPS closely tracked 
Lee’s Job Boredom Scale (r=.49, p<.001) that evaluated a person’s satisfaction, interest, 
and connectedness to his or her job suggesting that if a person is prone to boredom, he 




dictate.  Recall also the validation study done by Farmer et al. (1986) that found a strong 
correlation between the BPS and a boredom self-assessment questionnaire.  In addition, 
research on automation complacency by Prinzell et al. (2001) found a strong relationship 
between boredom proneness as measured by the BPS and a task-related boredom scale.  
Some of the strongest evidence for the trait versus state link in boredom comes from the 
research on boredom and vigilance by Sawin et al. (1995).  In their study, the researchers 
administered the BPS and another psychometric test measuring state boredom to their 
subjects about to undergo a vigilance test on a desktop simulator.  Their results suggest 
the BPS is a good indicator of vigilance performance.  The test also significantly correlated 
with the state boredom measure providing “…evidence for the long-sought, elusive link 
between trait boredom and performance in vigilance” (pg 763).  Clearly, research 
examining a link between state and trait boredom has involved correlating boredom 
proneness (trait boredom) in individuals with job boredom at work (state boredom).  The 
results by Sawin et al. (1995) are significant in that they permit the BPS, which measures 
trait boredom, to be utilized in measures that examine how state boredom affects 
automation complacency issues.  Recall that vigilance is an important component to 
preventing complacency.  Highly boredom prone individuals reported significantly more 
boredom than subjects did with low boredom proneness.  The BPS scores “…reflect the 
propensity to become bored as a result of completing a monotonous and under 




The research by Kass et al. (2001) hypothesized those individuals who perceived their 
work as repetitive, monotonous, and boring will score high on the BPS indicating a high 
proneness to boredom.  Their job assessment metrics were satisfaction, absenteeism, and 
tenure, and they expected absenteeism and tenure to be associated with both trait and 
state boredom measures. 
Consistent with Farmer et al. (1986), the researchers in the study found a correlation 
between state and trait boredom measures (r=.50).  The results also found that high levels 
of both job boredom (state) and boredom proneness (trait) contributed to lower job 
satisfaction scores.  Finally, the results indicated individuals with greater job tenure 
perceive their work as more boring consistent with the result found by Drory (1982).  This 
enhances the theory that repeated exposure to monotonous tasks results in lower arousal, 
less satisfaction, and greater boredom.  Finding both measures of boredom indicative of 
the same job problems support the idea that quantifying boredom proneness is an 
accurate measure of the problems associated with state boredom.   
Characteristics of Boredom Prone Individuals 
There is a wealth of studies on the psychopathology of boredom.  In their original work, 
Farmer and Sundberg (1986) found boredom to be associated with depression, 
hopelessness, and loneliness.  Other studies have positively linked boredom, as measured 
by the BPS, to procrastination (Vodanovich & Rupp, 1999; Ferrari, 2000), paranoia and 
self-consciousness (von Gemmingen, Sullivan, & Pomerantz, 2003), cognitive failure 




Freeman, & Milulka, 2001).  Other studies have examined how boredom affects 
psychological and physical health symptoms (Sommers & Vodanovich, 2000), and 
vigilance performance (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995; Kass, Vodanovich, Stanny, & Taylor, 2001).  
One of the constructs most applicable to this study and to aviation is the examination of 
boredom and attention lapses along with cognitive failure (Wallace, Vodanovich, & 
Restino, 2003; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008). 
Boredom and Attention Lapses, Cognitive Failure, and Flow 
In aviation, lapses of attention can lead to potentially tragic consequences.  For example, 
in the NASA ASRS database, ACN number 754217 recounts the story of a pilot who 
accidentally shut down one of the engines on his aircraft during the approach to landing 
sequence instead of moving the flap selector.  Fortunately, the crew caught the mistake in 
time and landed the aircraft safely.  However, the incident illustrates the nature and 
importance of attention and cognitive deficits.  Recall the factor structure of the BPS 
where Internal and External stimulation are the two main sources of alleviating boredom 
(Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Vodanovich, Craig, & Kass, 2005).  Research done by Kass, 
Wallace, & Vodanovich (2003) found a significant correlation between scores on the 
Boredom Proneness Scale and the Adult Behavior Checklist (ABC), a scale intended to 
assess symptoms associated with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  
The ABC has two sub-scales, one for attention and one for hyperactivity.  Using the factor 
approach to the BPS, the researchers found subjects who required more internal 




interests, scored high on the ABC attention subscale.  This provided “…empirical support 
for various conceptualizations of boredom as consisting of cognitive/attentional 
shortcomings” (Kass, Wallace, & Vodanovich, 2003, p. 86).   
These findings parallel the work by Wallace et al. (2003) who examined a possible 
association with boredom proneness as measured by the BPS to cognitive failure.  Their 
sample used a combination of military personnel and undergraduate students whom the 
researchers administered the BPS and the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ).  The 
CFQ is also subject to a factor approach similar to the BPS.  The variables causing any 
cognitive failures can be memory issues (memory failures and forgetfulness), distractibility 
(perceptions on divided attention tasks), blunders (physical mishaps resulting from 
inattention), and names (remembrances of associated names).  The overall results 
demonstrated that “…boredom proneness scores were found to be significant predictors 
of cognitive failures” (pg 641).  However, examining the results in detail found the factor 
most applicable to aviation in the CFQ questionnaire is arguably distractibility, since pilots 
often deal with multiple tasks when monitoring and supervising the automation 
(Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993).  Wallace et al. (2003) found that subjects scoring 
the high on the affective and time subscales of the BPS correlated the highest to the 
distractibility subscale of the CFQ (r=0.52 and 0.53 respectively, p<0.001).  This finding 
suggests that subjects who have an emotional reaction to boredom and who cannot 
properly cope with extended time passing will experience greater cognitive failures 




Work on boredom and attention continued with Cheyne et al. (2006).  In this study, the 
researchers postulated that the inability to engage in and sustain attention is boredom.  
This argument parallels the definition of boredom by Fisher (1993), when she proposed 
that part of the effect of boredom is a lack of interest and a difficulty in concentrating.  
Cheyne et al. (2006) found that their subjects who were more prone to memory failures 
and attention lapses also scored high on the BPS.  Further, they determined that these two 
underlying causes of the elevated BPS scores also contributed to depression, an illness 
that shares similarities with boredom including a negative mood and loss of meaning in life 
(Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008).  The results of Carriere et al. (2008) found that 
attention is the common link between depression, lack of meaning, and boredom.  Their 
conceptual model showed statistically significant and positive correlations between 
attention disorders and boredom proneness (r=.33, p<0.01) and depression (r=.18, 
p<0.01).   
Finally, boredom is counterproductive to a concept known as flow, or the “…holistic 
sensation that people feel when they act with total involvement” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 
p. 36).  Psychologists describe flow as intrinsic motivation, where constructs such as 
attention, focus, and absorption are effortless and come without much conscious thought.  
It is very similar to the practice of Zen, where the meditation goal is the elevation of 
thought into the subconscious akin to what professional athletes call being “in the zone.”  
An important concept regarding flow is the matching of skills and abilities to the 




assigned a task that is too demanding and outside of his or her abilities, anxiety often 
ensues disrupting the state of flow.  Conversely, tasks that are not challenging enough lead 
to boredom that also disrupts flow.  Shernoff et al. (2003) found that subjects in 
environments that insufficiently tasked them often developed coping strategies to bring 
their level of challenge to an optimal level in order to achieve flow.  This concept is 
important, as it highlights the tendencies of people to develop coping strategies if their 
workload is insufficient and boredom inducing.   
Coping with Boredom 
Coping with boredom, particularly in workplace settings, involves two general strategies 
(Fisher, 1993).  The first requires refocusing attention on the task and the second involves 
seeking additional stimulation.  Refocusing attention on a task may involve subjects forcing 
themselves to pay attention regardless of how they feel about it.  This is particularly true if 
the task carries an element of risk similar to the way risk effects monitoring and vigilance 
performance.  Another coping strategy for task refocusing involves goal setting and 
working toward the final result by emphasizing specific steps.  This technique is congruent 
with the findings by Shernoff et al. (2003), who posited that achieving flow best occurs 
when the goals and tasks are within a person’s skills and abilities.   
The other method for coping with boredom is to seek out additional stimulation either 
from the current task or by changing activities.  Seeking additional stimulation from the 
current task particularly during monotonous tasks often involves “subsidiary behaviors,” or 




1977).  These behaviors included actions daydreaming, talking to colleagues, playing 
mental games, fidgeting, and looking around among others.  While some of these 
behaviors reduced the monitoring performance slightly, they proved effective in reducing 
boredom slightly (Kishida, 1977).  Finally, another coping mechanism involves changing 
activities by engaging in things such as reading and other non-work related activities.  
Surveys of employee activities when people are bored indicated subjects tended to read 
novels or write letters during low workload periods (Fisher, 1987, as cited in Fisher 1993).  
Other tasks involved talking to co-workers about various subjects and reading training 
manuals.  Again, these results parallel the concept of flow, where individuals will 
undertake additional activities to bring the workload to an optimum level consistent with 









Since automation has become so prevalent, pilots have increasingly become monitors and 
supervisors of the automation instead of active controllers of the aircraft.  Thus, the nature 
of the work a modern pilot performs has changed.  This paradigm shift now subjects pilots 
to longer periods of low arousal and monotonous situations resulting from monitoring the 
automation to ensure it is performing correctly.  This can lead to boredom, and the 
purpose of this study is to examine what the effects of boredom are on automation 
practices.  This chapter discusses the study population, sample, and design in detail. 
Population 
The population group the study generalizes is glass flight deck pilots.  This is not isolated 
to just airline pilots, but rather any pilot who flies a large aircraft that relies heavily on 
advanced automation including autopilots and auto-thrust systems to successfully 
complete a flight.  The population group is not limited to pilot certificate, since a glass 
flight deck corporate aircraft does not require an Airline Transport Pilot license.  
However, there is a basic minimum standard of pilot requirements necessary to operate 
such aircraft.  The study has the most applicability to aircraft certified as transport 
category.  These aircraft typically feature the most advanced automation, and the pilots 




though the study’s population group is independent of license, the study assumes a high 
degree of piloting ability and experience as its population. 
Sample 
The study utilized pilots employed by a major airline (as measured by revenue) in the 
United States.  Each pilot was either a Captain or First Officer, and was an experienced 
pilot in a highly automated aircraft due to the nature of the airline’s hiring practices and 
fleet make-up.  Three hundred and one (301) subjects started the survey with 273 
completing it.  This represents slightly fewer than 4% of the total pilot population at this 
specific airline (not identified in this study).  All participants voluntarily donated their time 
and expertise and were uncompensated for their efforts.  Participants were under no time 
limits to complete the survey and could access the survey related internet pages at a 
location of their choice.   
Study Design 
The study recruited the sample subjects through posters placed on bulletin boards in 
common areas of each pilot domicile and through a recruitment message inserted in a 
“blast” e-mail sent to all pilots from the union representing them.  Both the poster and e-
mail message directed participants to a web site containing generalized information about 
the study along with a hyperlink to the survey.  The actual survey was administered on-line 
allowing confidentiality, anonymity, and accuracy. 
The study utilized a 4-part survey consisting of 55 questions to measure both 




requested general demographic information such as age and experience information from 
the survey participants.  The second portion administered the Boredom Proneness Scale 
(BPS) by Farmer and Sundberg (1986) which was used with permission.  The third portion 
of the survey administered the Pilot Automation Complacency Practices Scale (PACPS) 
that the author created and discussed in detail next.  Finally, the survey ended by 
measuring some general attitudes toward automation.  Survey respondents had several 
opportunities to insert free text regarding their individual practices or feelings toward 
automation. 
Pilot Automation Complacency Practices Scale (PACPS) 
The Pilot Automation Complacency Practices Scale derived its information from an 
examination of NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) data from a ten-year 
period between January 1999 and January 2009.  The search criteria focused only on 
anomaly reports from Part 121 operations where the causal factor was flight crew human 
performance.  The search also looked for any narrative or synopsis containing variations 
of the terms FMC/FMS, automation, and complacency.  These search criteria revealed 562 
records (see Appendix C).  An important consideration to remember is the nature of the 
ASRS program.  Since the program is voluntary and done primarily for immunization 
against certificate enforcement action, the numbers of reports are under-representative 
of the actual number of events.  A pilot may have an automation complacency event, but 
may not report it if no infraction occurred.  Of the 562 records, the analysis discarded 69 




Recall the complete definition of automation complacency.  Automation complacency is a 
term interchangeable with automation overconfidence, and is broadly described as pilots 
“…becom[ing] complacent because they are overconfident in and uncritical of 
automation, and fail to exercise appropriate vigilance, sometimes to the extent of 
abdicating responsibility to it.  This can lead to unsafe conditions” (Research Integrations. 
Inc, 2007).  Examining the evidence derived from the ASRS reports allows a factorial 
approach to the issue and reveals four subcategories pertaining to the causes of the 
broad issue of pilot automation complacency.  They are: 
1. Pilots fail to notice the automation mode or autopilot state after an FMS reprogram or 
other distracting event (Complacency Distraction).  The ASRS analysis indicates 137 
reports of this nature.  Common behaviors include: 
a. Air Traffic Control issues a late runway change causing pilots to reprogram the 
FMS.  The pilots do not notice the descent mode has changed or do not notice 
the altitude crossing restrictions have dropped out.  In both cases an altitude 
crossing deviation occurs. 
b. The pilots reprogram the FMS with new information during a mode change 
(for example, the aircraft leveling after a descent of climb).  The pilots do not 
notice the ensuing mode reversion resulting in an altitude deviation. 
c. Pilots reprogram the FMS with a new lateral route and fail to notice the 




HDG mode.  This causes the automation to follow heading information instead 
of programmed track guidance possibly resulting in a track deviation. 
d. The pilots experience an event that causes their workload to spike such as a 
system failure or a procedure interruption caused by non-essential issues.  The 
pilots fail to recognize any improper automation modes. 
2. Pilots do not crosscheck the automation for the correct restrictions, route, or 
information (Complacency Crosscheck).  The ASRS analysis indicates 108 reports of 
this nature.  Common behaviors include: 
a. A pilot failing to ensure the FMS has the correct departure, en-route, or arrival 
route programmed resulting in a track deviation. 
b. Pilots receive a new routing from ATC, and subsequently fail to ensure the 
FMS has activated the correct waypoint. 
c. Pilots fail to program the correct altitude and speed crossing restrictions in the 
FMS. 
d. Pilots enter a direct-to routing, and fail to ensure the aircraft is proceeding to 
the correct waypoint. 
e. Pilots fail to check the selected arrival or departure procedure waypoints 
and/or restrictions match the charted procedure. 
f. Pilots set the automation guidance (FMS, ILS, etc.) to the incorrect parallel 




g. Pilots fail to notice incorrect performance information resulting in improper 
altitudes, speeds and weight and balance information. 
3. Pilots fail to monitor the automation to ensure it is behaving as expected or required 
(Complacency Monitoring).  ASRS analysis indicates 169 reports regarding this 
conduct.  Common behaviors include: 
a. Pilots failing to monitor vertical automation with raw data information to 
ensure the aircraft will adhere to the altitude crossing restriction. 
b. Pilots fail to ensure the aircraft automation is performing as expected in the 
following ways: 
i. Failing to notice the aircraft has not acquired the TOD (top of descent) 
point. 
ii. Failing to notice the aircraft is not in the appropriate automation mode. 
iii. Failing to ensure proper navigation or speed capture and hold. 
c. Pilots’ failing to monitor lateral automation with raw data information to ensure 
the aircraft is on the correct navigation track. 
d. Pilots fail to notice the automation has either overshot or undershot the 
assigned altitude.   
4. Pilots are using the automation, or relying on automation flight guidance, instead of 
exercising manual pilot skills or abilities (Complacency Automation Over-reliance).  




a. Pilots attempt to use the automation to salvage a poor approach or an illegal 
situation (such as exceeding the 250 KIAS speed limit below 10,000 feet). 
b. Pilots utilize the autopilot to capture the localizer and glide-slope on the 
instrument landing system, and do not manually take over when the aircraft 
does not capture the landing guidance or behaves unexpectedly. 
c. Pilots fixate on programming the FMS during high workload situations to the 
exclusion of monitoring the aircraft’s state. 
d. Pilots exhibit poor flying skills when the automation is forcibly disengaged.  
e. On an ILS, the pilots continue to follow erroneous flight director guidance 
despite LOC and/or GS deviations. 
One of the final questions queried respondents regarding attention lapses.  Participants 
rated the approximate frequency in terms of the number of flights they experienced an 
attention lapse or loss of situational awareness that resulted in a missed or inappropriate 
action.  This question will allow the study to examine a possible link between boredom 
proneness and the attention and cognitive issues identified by Fisher (1993), Kass et al. 
(2003), Wallace et al. (2003), Cheyne et al. (2006), and Carriere et al (2008) as they relate 
to modern airline pilots.  The survey included questions assessing the participant’s self-
assessment of their boredom level during the majority of their flights (state boredom) 
along with a questionnaire regarding boredom coping mechanisms.  Additional questions 




a qualitative open-ended question asking about general attitudes toward the overall 
topic. 
Data Collection and Methods 
The analysis scored the BPS conventionally utilizing the 7-point Likert scale first employed 
by Vodanovich et al. (1990).  This technique allowed utilization of the factorial approach 
for greater sensitivity.  Survey respondents evaluated each statement from “highly 
disagree” to “highly agree” based on their experiences with the question.  A higher score 
on the BPS indicated a greater proneness to boredom. 
Most of the complacency practices questions asked the respondents to indicate the 
approximate percentage of the time they engaged in a particular behavior on a 6-point 
Likert scale.  For the first three sections on the PACPS, complacency distraction, 
crosscheck, and monitoring, a higher frequency of occurrence of the questioned behavior 
indicates a lower proneness to a complacency related action.  For three of the four 
questions on the final section, automation over-reliance, a higher frequency of occurrence 
of the questioned behavior indicated a greater susceptibility to improperly relying on 
automation.  The scoring system corrected the complacency scores to indicate the proper 
orientation with the boredom proneness test (high complacency scores indicate a higher 
proneness to a complacency related practice).  This approach allowed the study to 
tabulate quantitatively a complacency practices score for comparison to the BPS and 




scores (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990), a dimensional approach allows the PACPS to provide a 
more focused examination of what causes automation complacency.   
Instrument Reliability and Validity 
The literature has well documented the reliability and validity of the BPS as a full measure 
the boredom construct (see Vodanovich 2003 for a complete review).  A panel of industry 
and academic experts reviewed the PACPS to ensure proper content validity along with 
its efficacy in measuring automation complacency concept.  All of the behavioral questions 
on the scale originated from frequently observed actual flight crew experiences as 
reported to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (see Appendix C).  Thus, the 
scale was conceived from “real world” practices and scenarios experienced by pilots in the 
course of their daily duties.  Finally, the survey was available only to pilots at a major airline 
meaning the results are indicative of the automation practices from the group the survey 
generalizes.  There is no known dilution of the information from unqualified or “out of 
population” survey respondents. 
Proposed Data Analysis 
The Pearson correlation coefficient was the primary statistical tool used to analyze the 
results.  The study used SPSS statistical software and looked for significant associations at 
both the 0.01 and 0.05 alpha levels (2-tailed).  This allowed for a comprehensive cross-
referencing of all the variables and enabled identification of significant correlations 




A phenomenological study type analyzed the free comments section of the survey 
regarding automation coping strategies, boredom coping strategies, and general 
comments.  The results section will identify and display any trends in the data.  The goal of 
the free comments section is to identify any other issues of observations not directly 
addressed by the questions in the survey.   
Protection of Human Subjects 
Participants who volunteered their time and opinions did so at no jeopardy to themselves.  
Moreover, none of the behaviors questioned constituted an illegal behavior as defined by 
the Federal Aviation Regulations.  Participants remained anonymous throughout the 
entire process except for the generalized demographic data queried at the beginning of 
the survey and could have withdrawn at anytime during the process without consequence.  
The study author notified and received written permission from both the management of 
the respective airline and the collective bargaining agent representing the pilots to 
conduct the survey.  The study also obtained written permission to place recruitment 
posters in the airline’s common areas.  None of the questions in the survey will enable any 
person to identify either the pilot or the airline where the pilots work.  Finally, the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed and approved the 








Of the 273 survey respondents, 87.8% were male.  The majority (54.4%) fell between the 
ages of 41-50 years old, with the next highest group between the ages of 51-60 years old 
(28.2%).  Examining flying operations found 64.3% flew narrow-body aircraft in domestic 
operations (including Canada and Mexico) while 35.7% flew wide-body aircraft in 
international operations.  Finally, regarding the question of aircraft longevity, 54.5% had 
flown their respective airplane for greater than four years.  The next highest group 
(22.3%) had flown their airplane between 2 to 4 years.  The aircraft longevity groups of 
one to two years and less than one year comprised of 9.9% and 13.4% of the sample 
respectively. 
Research Questions Findings 
1. Are pilots who are more prone to boredom more or less likely to commit an 
automation complacency related behavior? 
 Pearson correlation coefficients indicated a statistically significant positive 
correlation (r=.181, p=0.01) between boredom proneness and automation 
complacency practices. 
2. Are pilots who have flown their current airplane for greater than four years more or 
less likely to commit an automation complacency related behavior than a pilot with 




 There are no statistically significant correlations between longevity in aircraft and 
automation complacency behaviors.  Moreover, there are no significant 
correlations between longevity in aircraft and self-assessed boredom or attention 
lapses. 
3. Are pilots who are more prone to boredom more or less likely to have a self-reported 
attention lapse? 
 Pearson coefficients indicated a statistically significant positive correlation (r=.171, 
p=0.01) between boredom proneness and attention lapses. 
4. Do pilots who fly wide-body aircraft in international operations self-report higher 
rates of boredom?  If so, does this cause them to make increased amounts of 
automation complacency mistakes? 
 There are no statistically significant correlations between operation type and self-
reported state boredom, boredom proneness, complacency related actions, or 
attention lapses.  The only statistically significant correlation (r=.176, p=0.01) is 
between operation type and the complacency subscale of monitoring.  This 
suggests pilots in narrow-body aircraft commit a greater number of complacency 
monitoring related actions. 
Data Summary 
Table 1 summarizes the correlations between boredom proneness factors and 
automation complacency related factors.  The table only displays significant correlations 




Table 1.  Boredom Proneness Factors and Automation Complacency 
Scales  
Boredom Proneness Factors 







Distraction   .198 .125  .120 
Crosscheck .132  .279 .219 .140 .187 
Monitoring .146  .196 .125  .127 
Automation 
Over Reliance 
.137 -.211 .175 .214   
Total .167 -.138 .291 .219  .181 
 
The Boredom Proneness Scale exhibited good validity with the self-assessment of state 
boredom (r=.499, p=0.01) and is consistent with other correlations of trait and state 
boredom (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 2001).  The BPS 
dimension regarding internal stimulation correlated negatively (r=-.190, p=0.01) with 
attention lapses suggesting pilot who can find stimulation from internal sources 
experience fewer self-reported attention lapses. 
The self-assessment of state boredom when correlated to the BPS factors indicated 
several significant correlations and is summarized in Table 2.  The table only lists 
significant correlations to the p=0.05 level.  Items in bold are significant to the p=0.01 
level. 
Table 2.  Boredom Proneness Factors and Self-assessed Boredom 
 Boredom Proneness Factors 
External Internal Affective Time Constraint 
Self-assessed 
Boredom 




Finally, the data indicated pilots are much more likely to commit an automation 
complacency related action and have an attention lapse when they assess themselves as 
bored.  Table 3 summarizes the results comparing complacency related actions and 
attention lapses to self-assessed boredom.  Again, bold items are statistically significant to 
the p=0.01 level. 
Table 3.  Complacency Factors/Attention Lapses and Self-Assessed Boredom 
 Complacency related factors 
Attention 







.140 .190 .252 .251 .305 .293 
 
DISCUSSION 
The data clearly associates both boredom proneness and self-assessed boredom to 
automation complacency actions and attention lapses.  Boredom is becoming a significant 
factor in modern aviation.  In the free comment section, one pilot wrote, “boredom is a 
huge problem which increases with the length of trip.  by [sic] day 4 i [sic] am gone.”  
Another pilot observed, “After boredom on a long flight, it’s [sic] hard to ‘speed-up’ to 
the [sic] brain activity to fly conscientiously!”  The increase in boredom is also associated 
with the increased level and emphasis on aircraft automation.  Modern pilot to aircraft 
interface designs center the aircraft on the automation, meaning a pilot is required to 
input many of the operational instructions through the FMC.  One pilot observed, “The 




the FMC just to tune a VOR for example.”  Other comments paralleled this theme and 
added the concept of dissatisfaction echoing one of the criteria necessary for boredom.  
Recall that dissatisfaction with the situation is one of the elements necessary to becoming 
bored (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993).  A pilot described the effect of automation as 
“…force[ing] us to become system monitors more than pilots.  I must force myself to be 
actively engaged.  Huge decrease in job statisfaction [sic].”  Both the quantitative and 
qualitative support boredom as an increasingly important issue in modern aviation. 
Internal and External Stimulation 
Examining some of the personality constructs identified in the Boredom Proneness Scale 
helps identify some of the underlying dimensions of boredom reported in the sample.  
Table 2 summarizes the correlations between self-assessed boredom and the BPS 
subscales.  The external, affective, and time subscales of boredom proneness correlated 
positively to state boredom while the internal subscale correlated negatively.  This finding 
suggests that pilots who are more adept at finding internal sources of stimulation are less 
likely to self-report themselves as bored.  Table 1 also displays a statistically significant 
negative association between the need for internal stimulation and automation 
complacency, especially the complacency subscale of over reliance.  Thus, pilots who are 
better adept at finding internal sources of stimulation are less bored, and engage in less 
complacency related behaviors.  Of the survey respondents, 85.3% indicated they hand 
fly as much as possible, an action that offers intrinsic rewards and could satisfy the need 




for the intrinsic satisfaction found in the action and thus less reliant on the automation.  
This could explain why pilots who scored higher on the internal dimension of boredom 
proneness committed less automation over reliance actions.  The survey question that 
queried participants on how they occupied their time revealed the vast majority, 85.3% 
and 64.5%, engaged in an internally stimulating behavior such as reading and logic puzzles 
respectively.  Another pilot wrote how he or she admired the scenery at altitude, an 
intrinsically pleasing act, by writing, “When weather permits, I enjoy watching the world go 
by below.  In doing so, I mentally keep tabs on where we are (big picture)…”  Another 
wrote how he or she enjoys “observ[ing] night sky, landscape etc.”  One pilot described 
the importance of internal stimulation through reading by writing, “If it were not possible 
to read during cruise my boredom level would be significantly higher.”  All of these 
actions are intrinsically rewarding activities and constitute an internal source of 
stimulation.   
By contrast, the pilots who indicated a greater need for external stimulation indicated a 
small but positive association with automation complacency behaviors (see Table 1) and 
self-assessed boredom (see Table 2).  The increase in self-assessed state boredom is 
possibly due to the limited environment in a flight deck that is largely devoid of external 
stimulation sources.  In some aircraft, the flight deck space is small making movement 
difficult.  Moreover, many airline policies forbid some externally stimulating activities such 
as video entertainment thus limiting those sources for the pilots who need them.  Of all 




flight deck (an external source of stimulation) was a means of preventing boredom.  One 
pilot rather candidly wrote, “…for me, the boredom level is directly related to how 
interesting my F/O [first officer] is.  I get more bored when I cannot engage anyone in 
conversation.”  In a similar vein, another pilot wrote that he or she enjoyed “chat[ing] with 
[the] flight attendants” and yet another stipulated “…boredom is a very large part of my 
flying time, thank God for the other guy in the cockpit.”  Since external sources of 
stimulation are limited in the flight-deck environment, pilots who are more adept at 
internal stimulation sources appear better able to handle the boredom, and are less likely 
to engage in a complacent behavior.  In other words, pilots who can find stimulation from 
intrinsic sources are better able to cope with boredom in a flight deck environment.    
The key term is the word cope, since the pilots the sample generalizes all require 
individual ways to deal with the boredom on their flights.  This could explain the lack of 
significant differences between pilots who fly wide-body international operations versus 
narrow-body domestic.  Each person has found an individual coping mechanism to deal 
with the boredom for their unique situation whether they are flying short legs in domestic 
operations or extended legs in the international realm.  According to the free comments 
in the completed surveys, these mechanisms can range from “…eat[ing] pistachios on red 
eyes…” to “study[ing] for law school.”  One particular pilot developed a game he or she 
could play with the other pilot using the navigation fix page in the airplane’s FMC.  In each 




emotional aspect of boredom found when there are inadequate individual coping 
mechanisms. 
Affective and Time Responses 
The affective subscale of the BPS is described as an individual having an “…emotional 
reaction to boredom” (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990, p. 118; Vodanovich, 2003, p. 571; 
Wallace, Vodanovich, & Restino, 2003, p. 638).  An individual with a high score on the BPS 
questions that relates to this subscale suggests that he or she has not developed an 
adequate boredom coping mechanism and is dealing irrationally with their boredom.  For 
example, a high score indicating agreement with question 9, “Many things I have to do are 
repetitive and monotonous,” might suggest a person has not found any good mechanisms 
that reduce the undesired characteristics of repetitiveness and monotony present in their 
particular situation.  The individual is reacting on an affective level rather than developing 
strategies to reduce the emotional response to a situation.  Thus, a high score on the 
affective subscale in this survey might indicate a pilot has difficulty finding an optimum 
method to deal with his or her boredom.  That individual then reacts emotionally to 
boredom inducing situations. 
A similar concept exists with the BPS subscale of time, defined in the literature as “…items 
related to the use of time” (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990, p. 118).  These questions probe an 
individual’s perception of time and boredom.  As with the affective subscale, a high score 
on the questions related to time could indicate inadequate coping strategies.  As another 




around doing nothing” could suggest a person who has difficulty finding coping strategies 
when the underlying cause is time.  All of the questions on this subscale involve how a 
subject perceives the passage of time, and whether adequate mechanisms can relieve any 
potential boredom caused by this construct. 
Table 2 displays the correlation between self-reported boredom and Boredom Proneness 
factors.  Of the five boredom dimensions, subjects who scored high on the affective 
subscale reported high self-assessed, or state, boredom suggesting that individuals who 
respond to boredom at an emotional level are more likely to experience boredom.  
Contrast this with the statistically significant negative correlation between the internal 
dimension of the BPS and self-assessed boredom (r=-.255, p=0.01) symptomatic of pilots 
adept in finding internal stimulation reporting less state boredom.  In the free comments 
section, a pilot described his or her emotional reaction to boredom in the following 
manner: 
I was much more attentive on the 737-200 than I have been on the Airbus.  
Despite my intent to not rely too heavily on automation, it is easy to do.  I am so 
bored/unhappy at [redacted] that I just put in for a voluntary furlough.  I was more 
attentive when I was happier in my job, which is part of my reason for leaving. 
The Boeing 737-200 is a non-automated aircraft that requires extensive pilot involvement 
when compared the Airbus A320.  Interestingly, this individual pilot self-assessed his or 




maximum self-assessment level.  Only 9.2% of the pilots in the sample rated themselves in 
this category.  Of all the survey respondents, only one person (0.4%) self assessed their 
boredom level at the maximum level. 
This finding parallels the data listed in Table 3, which positively associates greater self-
assessments of boredom with automation complacency related actions (r=.305, p=0.01) 
and attention lapses (r=.293, p=0.01).  In summary, a pilot who has a greater emotional 
reaction  to boredom (as determined by the BPS affective subscale) and who may not 
have developed adequate coping skills and mechanisms self-report higher states of 
boredom as described in Table 2.  Finally, the pilots who self-report higher states of 
boredom are associated with greater complacency related behaviors and attention lapses 
as demonstrated in Table 3 meaning pilots who score high on the affective subscale 
commit a greater number of complacency related practices.  The data in Table 1 support 
this hypothesis.  Isolating the affective subscale of the BPS finds a statistically significant 
positive correlation to automation complacency practices. 
Attention Lapses 
Isolating the BPS affective subscale with the self-reported frequency of attention lapses 
measure also indicates a statistically significant positive association (r=.288, p=0.01).  This 
association is significant especially when compared to how the BPS internal subscale 
associates with attention lapses (r=-.190, p=0.01).  As with the issue of complacency 
practices, this could indicate that pilots who respond emotionally to boredom or who 




at an increased frequency.  This finding also parallels the work by Wallace et al. (2003) 
who reported subjects who scored high on the affective and time subscales of the BPS 
positively correlated with a greater amount of cognitive failures during multiple tasks 
(r=.52 for affective, r=.53 for time, p<0.001).  According to Parasuraman et al. (1993), the 
airplane environment is a multiple task environment particularly when monitoring and 
supervising the automation is involved. 
Risk 
The issue of risk may be a mitigating factor in automation complacency (Riley, 1996).  This 
topic may help explain the relatively weak association between boredom proneness and 
automation complacency actions.  Riley (1996) argued that previous research on vigilance, 
an important component in automation supervision, neglected the concept of risk due to 
the reliance on desktop simulators for their practical data.  These desktop simulators 
tested vigilance by observing how often the sample subjects noticed a change in the 
display – a task that carries no risk to it.  The qualitative portion of the survey strongly 
support the concept of how perceived risk influences automation vigilance and 
supervision.  When asked about what strategies pilots utilize to ensure proper automation 
behavior, the variations of the term “crosscheck” appeared 25 times in the free text.  This 
suggests that despite any perceived reliability, consistency, or level of trust, the many of 
the pilots in this survey are deliberately monitoring the automation to ensure proper 
operation.  One pilot emphatically wrote that he or she, “Do[es] NOT trust the auto 




“…15000 PIC hours and 35 years…most mistakes have been witnessed or personally 
executed already.”  These pilots appear to be aware of the consequences of an 
automation vigilance mistake, and are taking active steps to increase their monitoring 
during critical phases.  As an example, a pilot wrote how he or she, “…ask[s] the F/O if he 
agrees with the inputs before executing (Boeing)…”  Yet another wrote, 
Always confirm the Flight Mode Annunciations (FMA).  Keep your eyes moving 
and ears listening.  Do not lean back in your seat and think nothing bad can/will 
happen.  Always think about what to do next before the automation actually does 
it. 
Thus, the concept of risk is a critical bias when considering automation vigilance and 
monitoring issues and strongly supportive of the findings by Riley (1996).   
The common thread with almost all of the free comments regarding this issue involves an 
acute awareness of the consequences of an automation mistake.  For example, an altitude 
deviation is an important topic with both tragic and legal consequences.  Many of the 
comments written by pilots involve their individual strategy to prevent altitude violations.  
One individual pilot summed up the concept when he or she wrote how the “fear of FAA 
punushment [sic] causes more attention to detail.” 
Finally, 55% of the pilots in the sample indicated they were more likely to experience an 
abnormal event, such as an unstabilized approach, when supervising the automation 




complacency.  Since the majority of respondents believe they are more likely to have an 
event of some sort whilst flying on automation, they may be more inclined to monitor the 
automation a little closer to avoid any abnormal happenings.  One pilot wrote, 
I never trust the automation.  My first ‘glass’ was the 737-300 where we were dual 
qualified with the -200 [737-200, a non-glass airplane].  We had no school or 
simulator so we learned by ‘trial and error.’  This resulted in a healthy distrust of 
the automation. 
In a similar vein, a pilot described a flight that utilized a procedure new to crew.  Since this 
was a new technique associated with considerable risk, the vigilance performance by the 
crew increased.  They described the experience by writing, 
Just last week I flew a TA (tailored arrival) test into LAX.  The automation reduced 
thrust to flight idle about 50 NM east of “FICKY” and remained in idle until the 
turn to final at LAX.  Perhaps 12-15 mins of throttles in idle.  Since this was a test 
program we were monitoring the flight VERY closely. 
Another pilot described his or her level of trust in the automation by writing, “Treating 
the automation like a bad copilot and watching everything the airplane is doing while in 
‘transitional’ mode.”  Finally, a pilot described an automation related incident he or she 
had as a young helicopter pilot in the Coast Guard that almost resulted in an accident with 




nothing.”  Clearly, the amount of risk involved in an operation determines the vigilance 
performance in the population group the sample generalizes.   
Similar to the individual techniques pilots utilize to cope with boredom, the pilots in this 
survey have developed individual strategies to cope with the automation.  A pilot wrote 
how he or she, “hold my ID in my hand for a cockpit ‘reminder’ of this that I need to do.”  
However, this concept is not limited to just remembering tasks.  Several pilots described 
how their individual method to solving the issue of automation over-reliance and 
boredom involves utilizing the automation in sub-optimum ways as a means of coping.  For 
example, one pilot wrote, “Very rarely do I let VNAV descend the plane.  Will use Vertical 
speed or level change.  Will reference VNAV TOD.”  Another wrote, “I prefer VSpd to 
VNav for descents, utilizing the green arc.”  Both of these pilots have found coping 
strategies that require an increased level of pilot involvement.  Using the vertical 
navigation, or VNAV, feature requires monitoring the automation while it conducts the 
descent whereas using vertical speed involves direct pilot input to manage the flight.  
Numerous comments reflect how pilots have developed other unique methods to ensure 
proper automation performance.   
Significance 
The implications of this research could involve topics such as employee selection, training, 
and operational procedures and are not limited to the airline industry.  The data suggests 
that individuals who are better able to find internal sources of stimulation are better at 




lapses.  This may influence how organizations select individuals tasked with vigilance and 
monitoring duties especially over extended periods of low stimulation where boredom 
might become an issue.  This is congruent with the findings by Vodanovich et al. (1997) 
who, after examining boredom proneness and work values, found that individuals high in 
boredom proneness may be better suited for work positions that offer, “…external [and] 
tangible rewards” (pg. 262).  Low boredom prone individuals are better suited for 
positions that “…emphasize intrinsic reward strategies” (pg. 262).  Individuals who are 
better able to generate internal stimulation may be better in environments that emphasize 
intrinsic rewards, and may perform better on vigilance and monitoring actions. 
An organization’s training syllabus could also reflect the findings in the data.  Since the 
concept of risk directly affects vigilance, training courses could expose and emphasize 
high-risk scenarios to students along with potential consequences of improper automation 
related actions.  One pilot in the survey lamented how the airline’s training courses 
overvalues automation training at the expense of manual skills.  He or she concluded their 
remarks by writing, 
Automation has made us weaker pilots.  Throw a pilot in a sim [simulator] and 
have them do a raw datat [sic] NDB approach without the goodies and they will 
struggle and some will fail…And our airline doesn’t train/check for this in the sims. 




The fleet tries all sorts of ridiculous solutions with no success but refuses to accept 
that the problem [a Boeing 757 fuel configuration issue] is the over reliance to 
automation and the mindset it has produced in the pilots assigned to this fleet. 
Both of these individuals describe a perceived training shortcoming where the training 
department has not adequately emphasized the risks involved with a particular action 
through demonstrated practice.  Since the study results have proven that the concept of 
risk is a significant influence on automation complacency, a powerful mitigation step might 
revolve around increasing the exposure individuals have to the consequences of 
complacent actions.  The teaching methods can include awareness training through 
ground-based lessons or simulator scenarios based on common automation incidents. 
Finally, operating procedures need to recognize the impact of boredom on vigilance and 
provide individuals with some latitude in finding sources of stimulation.  One particular 
pilot summed up this issue by writing, 
Unlike what official FAA and airline policy dictates, I find it absolutely crucial to 
find non-aviation items to engage the mind.  In over 30 years of flying I have yet to 
encounter a by-the-book pilot that focuses entirely on the flying that I considered 
safe.  All it does is put you to sleep or to make [sic] you so bored that you miss the 
obvious. 
This parallels the findings of Kishida (1977), who found that individuals would seek 




These behaviors may have the effect of slightly reducing monitoring performance, but 
prove effective in reducing boredom.  Therefore, policies that ban hand flying and 
activities such as non-essential reading could prove counterproductive.  While these 
activities may slightly degrade monitoring performance, the benefits gained in reducing 
boredom and its associated problems outweigh the risks.  Operational policies and 
training need to emphasize the risk involved with engaging in a “subsidiary behavior” at an 
inappropriate time, but should provide some latitude for individuals to utilize this as a 
coping mechanism when appropriate. 
Weaknesses 
One of the problems inherent in surveys of this nature is the reliance on self-assessment 
for some of the behaviors.  Some participants may have answered questions regarding 
automation practices based on how they want to operate versus how they actually 
operate.  Although question construction emphasized reporting of the deliberateness of a 
particular action (How often do you deliberately…), some of the respondents may have 
diluted the answers based on their perceptions of themselves.   
Future Studies 
Automation complacency is a topic not isolated to just aviation.  Future studies will be 
applicable to any profession that requires a high degree of vigilance and monitoring in 
automated settings that are conducive to boredom.  Such settings could involve safety 
critical activities with low margins for error such as nuclear power-plant operations, 




There are several possibilities for further research.  One possible avenue could involve 
employee selection criteria.  Since individuals who are better able to relieve boredom 
through internal sources commit fewer automation complacency errors, organizations can 
bias their selection processes and testing techniques to better identify these people.  
Further research can identify an optimum personality profile for individuals employed in 
the positions described above.  Once this profile is established, additional research can 
help ascertain the best methods to identify and select the individuals best suited for these 
positions. 
The issue of attention lapses is increasingly becoming prominent.  Further research on 
employee behavior through direct observation instead of written surveys regarding how 
and when boredom affects cognitive failure and attention lapses will prove useful in 
combating many automation issues.  Once the underlying criteria is adequately 
established,  research on improved procedure and checklist designs that could help 
mitigate any possible attention lapse related mistakes could prove valuable in combating 
the problem.  These procedures should emphasize Crew Resource Management 
principles and should incorporate research on how organizations could revise their 
training syllabi to give students a better awareness of the issues of boredom, attention 
lapses, and automation complacency.  
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has identified pilot fatigue in their 




Board, 2009).  Determining what effect, if any, pilot fatigue has on automation 
complacency and boredom is another possible area of research.  One pilot wrote 
regarding fatigue, “Alert means good attention and/or more handflying [sic].  Fatigued 
means more mistakes and/or more automation.” 
Finally, research regarding the optimum level and type of automation interface with the 
operator will be beneficial in mitigating the problems associated with the changing role of 
the modern airline pilot.  This includes researching how to transfer information to the 
pilot through advanced information displays, better ways to emphasize specific 
information, and methods of transferring situational information through non-visual means 
in order to provide the optimum balance between operator involvement and supervision 
or monitoring.  As written by several pilots in the free comments section, too much 
automation leads to a lower level of operator involvement and decreased situational 
awareness of the aircraft’s current state resulting in boredom.  In some cases, the 
automation is handling events without notifying the pilot of the actions it is taking further 
removing the pilot from the physical operation of the flight.  Yet de-automating aircraft is 
not feasible due to need for the advanced technology the industry requires in solving 
many of the future infrastructure issues.  Determining the best way to present information 
to the operator will be crucial in addressing the complex issue of boredom and 



















Boredom Proneness Scale 
1. It is easy for me to concentrate on my activities. 
2. Frequently when I am working, I find myself worrying about other things. 
3. Time always seems to be passing slowly. 
4. I often find myself at “loose ends,” not knowing what to do. 
5. I am often trapped in situations where I have to do meaningless things. 
6. Having to look at someone’s home movies or travel slides bores me tremendously. 
7. I have projects in mind all the time, things to do. 
8. I find it easy to entertain myself. 
9. Many things I have to do are repetitive and monotonous. 
10. It takes more stimulation to get me going than most people. 
11. I get a kick out of most things I do. 
12. I am seldom excited about my work. 
13. In any situation I can usually find something to do or see to keep me interested. 
14. Much of the time I just sit around doing nothing. 
15. I am good at waiting patiently. 
16. I often find myself with nothing to do – time on my hands. 
17. In situations where I have to wait, such as a line or queue, I get very restless. 
18. I often wake up with a new idea. 
19. It would be very hard for me to find a job that is exciting enough. 
20. I would like more challenging things to do in life. 
21. I feel that I am working below my abilities most of the time. 
22. Many people would say that I am a creative or imaginative person. 
23. I have so many interests, I don’t have time to do everything. 
24. Among my friends, I am the one who keeps doing something the longest. 
25. Unless I am doing something exciting, even dangerous, I feel half-dead and dull. 
26. It takes a lot of change and variety to keep me really happy. 
27. It seems that the same things are on television or the movies all the time; it’s 
getting old. 






Pilot Automation Complacency Practices Scale 
 
Subscale: Complacency Distraction 
1. On the majority of your flights, if ATC issues a runway change or other event that 
causes an FMS reprogram, how often do you deliberately check the automation 
mode (managed/VNAV PATH/open descent/level change etc.)? 
2. On the majority of your flights, if ATC issues a runway change or other event that 
causes an FMS reprogram, how often do you deliberately check to ensure any 
altitude crossing restrictions are still programmed? 
3. If you are interrupted by an event (such as a cabin issue, restroom break, etc.) how 
often do you deliberately check the aircraft’s automation mode after the event? 
4. When ATC issues a direct-to or a new flight plan routing or another later event 
that requires an FMS reprogram, how often do you deliberately check to ensure 
the NAV mode is engaged? 
Subscale: Complacency Crosscheck 
1. On your flights, how often do you deliberately check that the FMS is programmed 
with the correct SID, en route path, and STAR against the flight plan and/or ATC 
clearance? 
2. When receiving a direct-to instruction or programming the FMS and more than 
one waypoint with the same name is displayed, how often do you check the 
position (frequency, distance LAT/LONG) of the selected waypoint to ensure it is 
the desired one? 
3. When issued a departure or an arrival route, how often do you check to ensure 
the correct routing and/or altitude-crossing restrictions are programmed in the 
FMS against the Jeppesen or other kind of chart? 
4. If ATC issues you a “direct-to” instruction, how often do you switch to the plan 
view to ensure the aircraft is actually proceeding to the correct waypoint? 
5. When operating at an airport with parallel runways (for example Runways 35L and 
35R), how often do you deliberately check (during the approach briefing or any 
other time) to ensure the correct runway and/or localizer frequency is 




6. When inputting performance data (such as V-speeds, center of gravity, and weight 
information), how often do you deliberately check the data for accuracy and/or 
reasonableness? 
 
Subscale: Complacency Monitoring 
1. When issued an altitude crossing restriction, how often do you monitor the 
aircraft’s computed vertical path using mental math and/or raw-data information? 
2. On the majority of your flights when ATC issues an altitude crossing restriction, 
how often do you deliberately monitor your proximity to the top of descent 
(TOD) point and, if applicable, ensure the automation has captured the descent 
path? 
3. For the majority of your flights when conducting flight maneuvers (starting a 
descent, starting a climb, leveling off from a climb/descent, engaging NAV etc.), 
how often do you deliberately monitor the aircraft’s mode to ensure it is doing 
what is desired? 
4. When issued a SID that is “navable” by the FMS (not an RNAV SID), how often do 
you deliberately back up your lateral guidance with raw-data information and/or 
mental computations? 
5. For the majority of your flights, how often do you track the actual waypoint time 
and fuel burn against the predicted values during cruise? 
6. On your flights, how often do you deliberately watch the altimeter to ensure the 
automation has captured the correct (assigned) altitude after a climb and/or 
descent? 
7. Please list some of the strategies you use to ensure the automation is behaving 
correctly.  
Subscale: Complacency Automation Overreliance 
1. Think about the occasions where you have been “behind the airplane” with the 
autopilot on.  For those times, how often did you turn the automation off when 
correcting (no autopilot or auto-thrust) versus keeping the automation on? 
2. During high workload situations when FMS reprogramming is required, how often 
have you found yourself fixating on the FMS? 
3. For the majority of your flights, how often have you found yourself focusing on the 
Flight Director to the exclusion of other guidance cues (LOC/GS indication, map 




4. Please rate how confident you are in being able to turn off all the automation 
(autopilot and auto-thrust) and hand fly the aircraft in any weather condition day 
or night should the automation start behaving unexpectedly. 
a. Very confident 
b. Confident 
c. Somewhat confident 
d. A little confident 
e. Not confident at all 
 
Additional Survey Questions 
 
1. Do you think you are more likely to have some kind of abnormal event (for 
example, an unstabilized approach or “getting behind the airplane” when flying on 
automation or when hand flying (no autopilot and auto-thrust)? 
a. Automation 
b. Hand Flying 
 









some of the 
time 
Very bored 
most of the 
time 
Very bored 
all the time 
 
3. Please indicate all the methods you use to stay occupied during cruise.  Check all 
that apply and fill in where necessary. 
a. Read books, magazines, newspapers etc. 
b. Logic puzzles (crosswords, Sudoku, etc.) 
c. Chat with fellow pilot(s) 
d. Daydream 
e. Read aviation technical manuals, FOM, etc. 
f. Actively monitor progress of flight and/or automation. 





4. Thinking about your flights, do you sometimes find yourself having lapses of 
attention or situational awareness?  Do these lapses cause you to forget to do 
basic activities, or things you would not ordinarily do?  If so, approximately how 
frequently do they occur? 
a. Less than once every 15 flights 
b. Once per 10 flights 
c. Once per 7 flights 
d. Once per 5 flights 
e. Once per 2 flights 
f. Once per flight 
 
5. My automation philosophy is: 
a. Automation on as soon as possible after departure 
b. Automation on as long as possible when landing 
c. I hand fly as much as possible 
i. Autopilot ON after Departure 
5,000 AGL 10,000 AGL FL180 FL250 FL290 Cruise Alt 
 
ii. Autopilot OFF during Arrival 
FL290 FL180 15,000 10,000 AGL 5,000 AGL 3,000 AGL 
 
iii. If the altitude is not listed, please indicate your 
engagement/disengagement altitude 
 
6. If you like, please write down any comments you may have about automation, 






Selected evidence from NASA ASRS reports 
 




WE WERE NAVIGATING TO LAX ON THE SEAVU1 ARR. INSIDE OF KONZL, UPON CROSSING KONZL 
SOCAL APCH CLEARED US TO DESCEND VIA THE SEAVU1 FOR THE ILS TO RWY 24R. I WAS THE NON 
FLYING PLT AND CHANGED THE APCH IN THE FMC FROM THE ILS RWY 25L TO THE ILS RWY 24R. AT 
THE TIME OF THE CHANGE THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT DESCENDING VNAV PTH, WHEN THE 
AIRPLANE REVERTED TO VNAV SPD DURING THE RWY CHANGE. THE CAPT AND I WERE CLARIFYING 
THE RWY CHANGE WITH EACH OTHER AND I WAS VERIFYING THE LEGS FOR THE TRANSITION AND 
APCH WHEN I THEN NOTICED THE AIRPLANE REVERTED TO VNAV SPD AND DESCENDED BELOW THE 
CATAW RESTRICTION OF 14000 FT OR MORE. ACFT DESCENDED AND CROSSED CATAW AT 13500 FT. 
THERE WAS NO INQUIRY FROM ATC NOR WAS THERE ANY TA ADVISORIES OR RESOLUTION. VNAV 
PTH WAS REENGAGED AND THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AUTOMATION, 
WHEN IT WORKS WELL IS A GREAT THING, BUT HAS ITS PITFALLS AS WELL. THOSE OF US WHO FLY 
IN AND OUT OF LAX FREQUENTLY KNOW THAT ATC WILL CHANGE RWYS ON THIS ARR AT AN 
INCONVENIENT AND HIGHLY DISTRACTING TIME. BOTH PLTS NEED TO MONITOR ANY CHANGES TO 





FLT PLAN LOADED AT GATE ALONG WITH DEST RWY (ILS 1) AND NEW ALT CONSTRAINTS PER FDC 
NOTAMS AND COMPANY MESSAGES. WHILE ENRTE, RECEIVED DIRECT ESL ON ELDEE 3 ARR. LATER 
ISSUED CROSS 35 MI W ESL AT FL290. ENTERED INTO FMS. ATIS ADVISED LDA -- DME 19. CHANGED 
RWY IN FMS, BUT IN DOING SO, CLRED SOME XING RESTRS ON ELDEE 3, AND REVERTED SOME 
RESTRS TO OLD RESTRS. ALSO, WAYPOINTS THAT MAKE UP 19 ARR (HOOOK, CAPTL, ETC) WERE 
NOT LOADED. ALSO SLOWED IN ANTICIPATION OF HOLDING FOR HVY RAIN AND TSTM ON FIELD. 
CLRED TO DSND VIA ELDEE 3, FO INSERTED AND VERIFIED. FMS WAS BEHIND CALCULATING XING 
AT DRUZZ (15000 FT), AND SIMULTANEOUSLY FO ANNOUNCED HE WAS 'REFRESHING' THE XING 
RESTR AT DRUZZ. CAPT SCROLLED VERT SPD TO MAKE DRUZZ AT 15000 FT, AND COMMANDED 
8000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW, THE LOWEST ALT ON THE ARR. CREW BECAME DISTR BY NEW FIXES 
AND RESETTING ALT RESTRS, AND ACFT DSNDED BELOW 15000 FT AFTER DRUZZ. FO NOTICED AND 
CALLED OUT. CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND BEGAN CLB. FO CALLED ATC TO ADVISE. ATC 
STATED, 'MAINTAIN 13000 FT, DSND VIA ELDEE 3, YOU'RE FINE.' FLT COMPLETED WITHOUT 





ATC CHANGED ARR RWYS WHILE WE WERE DSNDING ON THE STAR. WE WERE BOTH CONSUMED IN 
REPROGRAMMING THE FMC AND FAILED TO NOTICE THAT THE AUTOPILOT HAD DEFAULTED TO 
V/S. BEFORE EITHER OF US NOTICED WE HAD DSNDED BELOW A CROSSING RESTR. FOLLOW SOP 
WHEN REPROGRAMMING MED INFORMATION, ALWAYS HAVE THE MONITORING PLT MONITORING 









THIS FMS ACFT FLEW A FLAWLESS VNAV DSCNT FROM FL370 NON-STOP TO IDLE TO 11000 FT. I 
HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMS TO CROSS ZZZZZ AT 11000 FT AND 310 KTS. THE ACFT CAPTURED 
11000 FT AND LEVELED OFF. THIS WAS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY THE SPD BEING DRIVEN TO 
224 KTS WITH THE THROTTLES RETARDING. IN THE INITIAL CONFUSION I SELECTED SPD SELECT AND 
ROTATED THE SPD BACK TO 310 KTS. A VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION ENSUED AS TO WHY IT DID THAT. 
FO PULLED UP THE DSCNT PAGE AND VERIFIED THAT IT SAID ZZZZZ AT 11000 FT AND 310 KTS. MY 
FO THEN CALLED OUT 'ALT!' WE HAD DSNDED TO 10700 FT. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND 
CLBED BACK TO 11000 FT. ATC DID NOT MENTION IT. ALL I CAN THINK THAT HAPPENED WAS THAT 
WHEN I SELECTED SPD SELECT WE STILL HAD SOME RESIDUAL DOWN VVI AND WERE NOT 
COMPLETELY IN FMS ALT HOLD THAT CREATED THE INSIDIOUS DSCNT. HAD I SELECTED ALT HOLD 
PRIOR TO SPD SELECT, AS WE DO EXITING PERFORMANCE IN ANY OTHER AIRPLANES, THIS 
WOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED. HOWEVER, I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY IT FLEW SUCH A PERFECT 
DSCNT, LEVELED OFF WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS ZZZZZ AT 11000 FT AND 310 KTS THEN 
SLOWED THE SPD TO 224 KTS. WHY NOT 240 KTS? AND WHY WOULD IT DO THAT WITHOUT 
CAPTURED AT THE 11000 FT ALT? FROM A HUMAN FACTORS POINT OF VIEW, IT WAS VERY LATE 
(FOR ME), DARK, AND THE 'SURPRISE' DISTR OF AN UNCOMMANDED SPD REDUCTION TO UNIQUE 
SPD (224 KTS VERSUS 240 KTS) WERE JUST ENOUGH TO KEEP ME FROM CATCHING THE SOLID HARD 
11000 FT LEVELOFF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 778175: REFLECTING BACK ON THE 
INCIDENT, I WOULD VENTURE TO GUESS THAT THE CAPT MIGHT HAVE PRESSED 'SPD SELECT' AS 
THE AUTOPLT WAS COMPLETING ITS ALT CAPTURE AT 11000 FT, THUS PUTTING THE ACFT INTO A 
VERT SPD DSCNT JUST AS IT APCHED 11000 FT. WE BOTH WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE AS TO HOW IT 
GOT INTO VERT SPD BUT, REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE, THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON LEARNED IS 
THAT YOU SIMPLY CANNOT TURN YOUR BACK ON THE ACFT AND THE OP OF ITS AUTOMATION 












ILS FREQ WAS WRONG ON APCH INTO BOS 109.9 INDICATED FOR 110.3 WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 
INDICATED FOR ILS APCH INTO RWY 4R FOR BOS. PROB OCCURRED ON APCH WITH ILS AND GS 
ARMED. WRONG FREQ NOTICED WITH MOMENTARY INDICATION OF PURPLE LOC INTERCEPT 
INDICATED. PLT SWITCHED BACK TO NAV BUT BY THE TIME FIELD WAS IN SIGHT. TWR INDICATED 
ACFT WAS BELOW GS AT MILTT BUT ACFT WAS LEVEL AND TRACKING TO CROSS MILTT AT 
RECOMMENDED ALT. ILS FREQ 109.9 HAPPENS TO COINCIDE WITH DCA 18 WHICH WAS ACFT DEP 
POINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE PROBLEM 
WAS APPARENTLY CORRECTED BY MAINTENANCE WITH A SOFTWARE RELOAD INTO THE FMGC. 





FMS RWY CHANGE FROM RWY 26R TO RWY 27L ACCOMPLISHED, BUT LOCALIZER FREQUENCY 
CHANGE WAS NOT. ON 240 DEG VECTOR TO LOCALIZER RWY 27L, ACFT INTERCEPTED LOCALIZER 
RWY 26R. IMMEDIATE CORRECTION MADE TO LOCALIZER RWY 27L. CLRNC FOR RWY 27L 





AT ROTATION ON TKOF IN NGO NOTICED A BUMP THAT FELT LIKE IT CAME FROM THE GEAR AREA. 
WE LOOKED AT THE EICAS GEAR SYNOPTIC PAGE TO SEE IF WE HAD BLOWN A TIRE ALONG WITH 
CHKING ALL OTHER SYS. EVERYTHING CHKED NORMAL. DURING THIS TIME WE GOT SEVERAL 
INSUFFICIENT FUEL MESSAGES, HOWEVER DISMISSED THEM BECAUSE THE WINDS HAD NOT BEEN 
COMPLETELY PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC. AFTER WE GOT TO ALT 33000 FT THE FO BROUGHT TO 
MY ATTN THAT PROGRESS PAGE 2 CALCULATED FUEL WAS COMING UP AT APPROX 68000 LBS AND 
NO TOTAL FUEL WAS INDICATED ON 6L PROGRESS PAGE 2. I SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH AND 
MAINT CTL TO SEE IF THEY MIGHT HAVE AN IDEA HOW TO CORRECT THE PROB. SHORTLY AFTER WE 
DISCOVERED THE WRONG INFO ON THE CALCULATED FUEL BLOCK ON THE PERFORMANCE PAGE 
AND CORRECTED IT. THIS ALLEVIATED THE PROB. AT THIS POINT WE BECAME MORE CONCERNED 
ABOUT A POSSIBLE TAIL STRIKE, KNOWING OUR TKOF NUMBERS WERE WAY OFF. THE FO AND I 
DISCUSSED THIS AND WHAT ACTION, IF ANY, SHOULD BE TAKEN. AFTER CHKING ALL SYS THERE 
WERE STILL NO INDICATIONS OF ANYTHING ABNORMAL. AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE FO, I 
DECIDED TO WAKE THE CAPT, THE RELIEF PLT, TO GET HIS INPUT, WHICH WAS TO CONTINUE. I 
AGREED, THINKING THAT WE SIMPLY HAD HIT A BUMP ON THE RWY. AFTER ARRIVING IN DTW, WE 
INSPECTED THE TAIL SECTION AND CONFIRMED THERE HAD BEEN A TAIL STRIKE. CALLBACK 
CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT THIS INCIDENT 
WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN INVESTIGATION BY THE ACR AND THE FAA. NO PROBABLE CAUSE SHORT 
OF A FINDING OF LIKELY PLT ERROR IN PROGRAMMING THE PERFORMANCE INITIALIZATION PAGE 
WAS REACHED. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT SOMEHOW AN IMPROPER MANUAL ENTRY WAS MADE 
TO THE FUEL ON BOARD LINE OF THE PERFORMANCE INITIALIZATION PAGE WHICH OVERRODE THE 
AUTOMATIC FMC CALCULATION WHICH NORMALLY IS UTILIZED BY THE FMC FOR DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE TKOF V-SPDS. THE SPECIFICS OF HOW THIS OCCURRED WAS UNRESOLVED. THE RPTR AND 
THE ANALYST AGREED THE LACK OF AN INDEPENDENT CALCULATION METHOD FOR COMPARISON 










WE WERE FILED SJC.LOUPE1.LIN FOR OUR FLT TO ZZZ. THE FMGC WAS CHKED AND VERIFIED WITH 
THE PAPER CHART. CLBING OUT OF SJC, WE FOLLOWED THE LOUPE1 PROC BY TURNING TO A HDG 
OF 120 DEGS AT 1.8 DME FROM SJC. WHILE ON THAT HDG, DEP TOLD US TO GO DIRECT TO SJC AND 
RESUME THE DEP. I PUNCHED IN DIRECT TO SJC. DID NOT NOTICE THAT 2 WAYPOINTS HAD 
DROPPED OUT. SO AFTER THE SJC VOR WE WENT TO LIN INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING TO DYBLO THEN 
LIN. ATC NOTICED THE DEV AND INQUIRED WHERE WE WERE GOING. THAT IS WHEN WE NOTICED 
THE ERROR IN THE FMGC. DEP CTLR THEN CLRED US DIRECT TO LIN. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. 
WE LATER CONFIRMED THAT WE BOTH CHKED THE DEP PRIOR TO TKOF AND IT WAS CORRECT IN 
THE FMGC. NOT SURE WHY THE DEP WAYPOINTS DROPPED OUT, BUT WILL REMEMBER TO ALWAYS 












SHORTLY AFTER THE TOP OF CLB AT FL300, THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. AT FIRST, I THOUGHT 
THAT IT MIGHT BE AN ERRONEOUS ACTIVATION, BECAUSE THE ACFT ATTITUDE LOOKED NORMAL, 
WE WERE IN LEVEL FLT, AND I HAD NOT NOTICED ANY CHANGE IN ACFT WIND NOISE, PITCH ANGLE, 
OR TRIM. I NOTED THAT MY AIRSPD WAS APPROX 220 KIAS. I CALLED OUT TO THE FO, WHO WAS 
PF, THAT IT MIGHT BE A FALSE STICK SHAKER. I THEN NOTED HIS AIRSPD, WHICH WAS ALSO VERY 
LOW. I CALLED OUT LOWER THE NOSE, BUT BY THIS TIME HE HAD ALREADY ADVANCED THE 
THROTTLES, DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGUN A DSCNT. WE ALSO HAD INOP EEC'S TO 
CONSIDER. I INFORMED BRASILIA CTR OF THE SITUATION, AND THEY CLRED US INTO AIRSPACE 
FROM 280 TO 300. WE REGAINED AIRSPD AND RETURNED TO NORMAL CRUISE. OUR LOWEST ALT 
WAS APPROX 28700 FT. AS WE WERE DISCUSSING WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED, THE 
AUTOTHROTTLES STARTED TO PULL THE THROTTLES BACK FOR NO REASON. AT THIS POINT, WE 
DISCONNECTED THEM. THIS ACFT HAD A RECENT HISTORY OF AUTOTHROTTLE MALFUNCTIONS, 
MOST OF WHICH DESCRIBED UNCOMMANDED DISCONNECT. HOWEVER, THERE WAS ONE 
DESCRIBING AN AUTOTHROTTLE MALFUNCTION LIKE WE HAD, BUT I WAS NOT AWARE OF IT 
BECAUSE IT WAS FURTHER BACK THAN I HAD REVIEWED. I AM GUESSING THAT THE 
AUTOTHROTTLES HAD RETARDED FROM CLB TO A BELOW CRUISE PWR SETTING, AND IN THE DARK 
WE DID NOT DETECT THE THROTTLE POS. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, I WAS PREPARING MY CHARTS FOR 
POS RPTS, AND THE FO WAS EDITING THE FMS. ALTHOUGH I ALWAYS ATTEMPT TO MAKE SURE 
ONLY 1 PLT IS HEADS DOWN AT A TIME, I CANNOT SAY FOR SURE WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE. 
IN RETROSPECT, I PROBABLY SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THIS TRIP, WHICH STARTED OUT IN 
ZZZ1 AND REQUIRED ME TO DEADHEAD ON VERY SHORT NOTICE TO ZZZ2 AND FLY THE ALL-
NIGHTER TO SBGL. I WAS AWAKE FOR ALMOST 30 HRS, FOLLOWED BY A 34 HR LAYOVER AND 
ANOTHER ALL-NIGHTER, DURING WHICH THIS EVENT HAPPENED. OBVIOUSLY, I WAS NOT 






FLYING THE CHANNEL 1 DEP, VENTURA TRANSITION FROM SNA. THE RTE WAS ENTERED 
CORRECTLY. I ALSO CHKED THE FIRST 3 LEGS BUT DON'T REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE FOLLOWING 
ONES. AFTER TKOF ON THE 175 DEG HDG AND IN A CLEAN CONFIGN, I ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT 
WITH LNAV ENGAGED. WE WERE CLBING TO ONLY ABOUT 6000 FT. AFTER AWHILE THE AUTOPLT 
TURNED THE ACFT. THE MAP AND FLT DIRECTORS WERE CTRED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE 
NOTICED AND ATC ASKED WHERE WE WERE GOING. WE WERE GOING DIRECTLY TOWARDS SXC ON 
A 230 DEG HDG. WE HAD NOT DONE THE 200 DEG HDG TO THE 084 DEG RADIAL. ATC TOLD US TO 
GO DIRECTLY TO SXC. NO FURTHER COMMENTS FROM ATC. WE CHKED THE FMC AND IT SHOWED 
WE HAD CHANNEL 1 DEP AND THE VENTURA TRANSITION AS ACTIVE. WE CHKED AND THE DEP IN 
THE FMC HAD THE 200 DEG HDG AND 084 DEG RADIAL IN THE LEGS PAGE. THE FO SAID HE HAD 
SEEN ALL OF THE LEGS PRESENT BEFORE THE TKOF. WE HAD NOT GONE DIRECTLY TO A FIX, NOR 
CLOSED ANY DISCONTINUITIES. I SHOULD ALWAYS COMPARE THE ACFT'S ACTUAL FLT PATH TO THE 
10-3A PAGE. SAFETY SHOULD VERIFY THAT THE DEP WILL BE FLOWN CORRECTLY WITH THE 
CURRENT DATABASE LOADED IN THE ACFT FLEET. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED 
THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STILL DOES NOT KNOW WHY THE FMC WENT DIRECT TO SXC 
INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE CHANL1. UPON ARR AT DEST THE CREW LOADED THE RTE THEY HAD 
JUST FLOWN, AND ALL THE POINTS LOADED CORRECTLY. THE RPTR HAS NOT BEEN BACK TO SNA 







AT FL380 NEARING TOP OF DSCNT FOR XING BEARZ INTXN AT 11000 FT PRESET ON LEGS PAGE OF 
FMC, WE WERE GIVEN A XING RESTR OF 35 MI SE OF FWA AT FL340. I MISKEYED THE XING ON FIRST 
ATTEMPT IN FMC AND THEN BY THE TIME IT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED WE WERE AT THE NEW 
DSCNT POINT. BECAUSE OF BRAIN SLIPPAGE, AFTER WE HAD VNAV SPD AND HAD STARTED DOWN, 
I TRIED TO INSTALL THE 320 KT SPD REQUESTED ON THE CRUISE PAGE. THIS MESSED UP THE 
PROFILE AND WE WENT HIGH ON THE PROFILE WHILE THE FMC RECOMPUTED. BY THE TIME I 
STARTED TO CORRECT FOR THE HIGH ON PROFILE CONDITION IT WAS TOO LATE TO MAKE 35 MI SE 
FWA XING AT FL340. WE WERE AT APPROX FL347 AT THE XING. WE WERE CLOSE ENOUGH I 
THOUGHT THAT WE DID NOT NEED TO TELL ATC. ATC'S ONLY COMMENT WAS, 'WHEN YOU'RE 
LEVEL FL340, GO DIRECT OXI.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 693398: WHILE IN CRUISE AT FL380 
WE WERE ISSUED AN ENRTE DSCNT TO CROSS 35 MI SE OF FWA AT FL340. WE STARTED THE DSCNT 
AND CHKED IN WITH ZID AT THE SAME TIME. THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT AND DSNDING VIA THE 
VNAV PATH. AFTER I, AS THE PNF, VERIFIED THE ACFT WAS FOLLOWING THE PATH PROPERLY AT 
THE BEGINNING OF THE DSCNT, I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO OTHER AREAS OF THE COCKPIT 
(REQUESTING WX, CHKING LNDG WTS, ETC) AND DID NOT LOOK BACK AT THE PATH UNTIL THE 
ACFT WAS APCHING THE 35 MI FIX. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED THE PATH INDICATOR WAS MISSING 
FROM THE DISPLAY AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE GOING TO MISS THE XING RESTR BY 
SEVERAL HUNDRED FT. WE CROSSED THE 35 MI FIX AT FL346 (600 FT HIGH). AFTER WE LEVELED I 
ASKED THE CAPT WHY THE AIRPLANE CAME OFF PATH(AS I WAS HEADS DOWN AND DIDN'T SEE 
WHAT HAPPENED) AND WAS INFORMED THAT HE CHANGED THE CRUISE ALT IN THE CRUISE PAGE 
TO FL340 WHICH DELETES THE VNAV PATH FOR ANY ASSIGNMENTS AT OR ABOVE THAT. I SHOULD 
HAVE NEVER LET MY ATTN GET DIVERTED WHILE IN THE DSCNT FOR A RESTR LIKE THAT. I WAS 
LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY BECAUSE THE DSCNT WAS SO SHORT (ONLY 4000 FT 
WHICH ON PATH TAKES ABOUT 2 MINS) AND BECAUSE THE VNAV PATH WORKED SO WELL ONCE IT 
STARTED THE DSCNT I FALSELY ASSUMED IT WOULD WORK AND IT WOULD NOT BE CHANGED 
(WHICH IT WAS). I ALSO SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE CAPT TYPING ON THE FMC BUT FOR SOME 
REASON EITHER DIDN'T OR IT DIDN'T REGISTER THAT HE MIGHT BE CHANGING SOMETHING WHICH 





SHEAD DEP TO OAK, FO FLYING, AUTOPLT ENGAGED COMMAND MODE. ASSIGNED 11000 FT, 
DIALED IN MODE SELECTOR WINDOW. OUT OF 11000 FT, FO REDUCED PITCH TO APPROX 500 FPM 
TO ACCELERATE TO FMC CLB SPD. AT ABOUT 300 KTS AND 10300 FT WE GOT MODERATE CHOP. FO 
INCREASED PITCH TO SLOW, PULLING UP TO APPROX 3000+ FPM. ALTHOUGH THE AFDS WENT TO 
ALT ACQUIRE, I KNEW (THE HGS WAS MY FIRST INDICATION, I'M AN HGS FLYER) THE AUTOPLT 
WOULD OVERSHOOT THE LEVELOFF. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT (APPROX 10600 FT) AND 
MANUALLY LEVELED OFF USING THE HGS AND RETARDING THE THRUST LEVERS. WE TOPPED OUT 
BTWN 11300 AND 11400 FT BEFORE LEVELING AT 11000. THE DEP CTLR HAD ISSUED US G-4 TFC AT 
10 O'CLOCK POS, 12500, DSNDING ON THE ARR, AND ASKED US IF WE WERE LEVELING AT 11000 FT. 
I TOLD HIM THE AUTOPLT HAD OVERSHOT THE LEVELOFF, BUT WE WERE NOW LEVEL AT 11000. WE 
DID NOT RECEIVE A TCAS TA OR RA AT ANY TIME. LEVEL AT 11000 FT, I GAVE THE ACFT BACK TO 
THE FO, HE RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND WE CONTINUED TO OAK. AT CRUISE I DISCUSSED THE 
EVENT WITH THE FO, EXPLAINING THAT THE OVERSHOOT WAS NOT AN AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION, 
BUT THAT HE HAD 'ASKED TOO MUCH' OF THE AUTOPLT WHEN HE INCREASED THE RATE OF CLB SO 
MUCH SO CLOSE TO LEVELOFF ALT, ESPECIALLY WITHOUT A LARGE PWR REDUCTION. I APOLOGIZED 
FOR TAKING THE ACFT SO SUDDENLY AND DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT, BUT EXPLAINED THAT 
THE HGS GAVE ME THE CLUE THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT GOING TO 'HACK' THE LEVELOFF 
BEFORE HE REALIZED THAT IT WAS GOING TO OVERSHOOT. THE HGS IS GOLDEN FOR SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS. THE TIME FROM THE FO'S INITIAL PULL-UP IN RESPONSE TO THE CHOP, TO MY 











FO OF A319 MAKES NUMEROUS AUTOFLT MANAGEMENT AND MENTAL ERRORS ON APCH 
CULMINATING IN MANUALLY DESCENDING WHILE THE AUTOTHRUST SYSTEM WENT TO CLIMB 
THRUST AS PROGRAMMED.  FLAP OVERSPEED RESULTS. 
 





I WAS THE FO ON THIS FLT. WE WERE ASSIGNED THE LOOP 4 DEP OUT OF LAX. ALL WAS FINE UNTIL 
ABOUT 2000 FT AS WE HAD JUST MADE OUR TURN TO 235 DEGS. THEN THE CTLR TOLD US TO 
COMPLY WITH THE ALT RESTRS. SINCE WE WERE IN A RUSH TO DEPART DUE TO A WHEELS UP 
TIME, THE CAPT NEVER BRIEFED THE DEP (FIRST MISTAKE). HE WAS HAND FLYING, SO I WORKED 
THE FCP. I GAVE THE CAPT HDG HOLD FOR 235 DEGS. WHEN THE CTLR GAVE US THE VERT RESTR, 
THE CAPT PRESSED NAV ON THE FCP. THE NORMAL PROC IS TO ASK THE PNF (ME) TO DO THIS. SO 
THIS CAUGHT ME OFF GUARD. THE CAPT SAID SOMETHING ABOUT TURNING TO MAKE THE ALT 
RESTR AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT ALSO, TURNING THE VERT SPD WHEEL (NOTICED LATER, THE 
WRONG WAY). I WAS LOOKING AT MY DEP PLATE OR OUTSIDE AND DIDN'T NOTICE AT FIRST 
(DISTR), BUT THE ACFT WENT INTO APCH MODE AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES CAME BACK INSTEAD 
OF STAYING AT CLB PWR. AS I TRIED TO FIGURE THIS OUT, THE CAPT SAID HE WOULD LEAVE THE 
SLATS OUT AND HE GOT SLOW (APPROX 200-230 KTS). HE SAID TO MAKE THE CLB RESTR (10000 FT 
OVER LAX). MEANWHILE, I WOULD TURN OFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND PUSH UP THE PWR, AND 
HE WOULD DISCONNECT AND RECONNECT THE AUTOPLT SEVERAL TIMES. I TOLD HIM IF HE WOULD 
MAINTAIN A CLB AT 230 KTS, WE WOULD MAKE THE RESTR ACCORDING TO THE FMS VERT PROFILE. 
YET BECAUSE THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS IN A DSCNT, HE KEPT LOWERING THE NOSE. I KEPT TELLING 
HIM TO KEEP THE NOSE UP AND ALSO FIDDLED WITH THE THROTTLES AS THEY KEPT COMING BACK. 
THIS WAS BASICALLY A MESS AS WE TURNED INBOUND TO LAX. I MADE SURE HE KEPT THE 
AUTOPLT OFF AS WE GOT CLOSER TO LAX. I DON'T THINK WE MADE 10000 FT EXACTLY AT LAX, BUT 
IT WAS CLOSE. THE CTLR WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH THE SLOW SPD WITH ACFT BEHIND US. 
EVENTUALLY WE GOT BACK TO CLB MODE AND A FEW MINS LATER I REALIZED WE HAD SPUN THE 
VERT SPD WHEEL THE WRONG WAY. EITHER THIS, OR GOING TO NAV ON A MANUAL LEG IN FMS 
HAD CAUSED THE FMS TO GO INTO APCH MODE. IN HINDSIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE SLOWED DOWN 
THE TIME ON GND TO BRIEF (THE CAPT WAS MORE CONCERNED EARLIER WITH GETTING CATERING 
BEFORE LAUNCH THAN WITH THE WHEELS UP TIME). ALSO, I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED HIS 
INCORRECT INPUTS TO THE FCP, AND BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE IN EITHER HANDLING THE FCP OR 
TAKING THE ACFT FROM HIM AS HE WAS CLRLY MIXED UP. WE LET THE AUTOMATION GET THE 








WHILE ARRIVING ON HONIE ARR, WAS GIVEN VERY LATE DSCNT TO 14000 FT. THEN WAS SLOWED 
TO 280 KTS, MAKING XING RESTR AT HONIE IMPOSSIBLE. MISSED XING BY AT LEAST 5 MI. THEN 
WAS GIVEN NEW DSCNT TO 12000 FT. SET UP NEW CRUISE ALT IN FMS AND PLANNED FOR THE 
HONIE VNAV ARR WITH A RWY 27L ILS. VERY CLOSE TO FOGOG, ATC GAVE US 11000 FT WITH A 
RESTR TO STILL CROSS FOGOG AT 11000 FT AND THEN CONTINUE DSCNT ALONG HONIE ARR. 
PLUGGED IN A NEW CRUISE ALT AND STARTED DSCNT TO 11000 FT. HAD 4000 FT IN THE ALT 
WINDOW AS THIS WAS THE FINAL ALT ALONG THE ARR. TRIED TO PLUG IN 210/110 AT FOGOG. FMS 
WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. I SAW TOP OF DSCNT WAS PRIOR TO FOGOG. TRIED SEVERAL TIMES, 
SEEMS I THOUGHT I HAD MADE A TYPO. ACFT STARTED A DSCNT APPROX 2 MI PRIOR TO FOGOG. 
AT 10600 FT, ATC MADE STRONG SUGGESTION WE WERE NOT AT FOGOG AND TO RETURN TO 
11000 FT. CLICKED OFF AUTOPLT, PULLED BACK AND PUSHED THROTTLES UP, RETURNED TO 11000 
FT. I SIMULTANEOUSLY HAD ATC YELLING AT US, TCAS GOING OFF, AUTOPLT WARNING, AND FO 
DEBATING ATC. CALLED ATC ON THE GND, HAD A VERY GOOD CONVERSATION WITH SEVERAL 
CTLRS. ATC WAS GOOD ENOUGH TO TELL ME THERE HAD NOT BEEN A LOSS OF SEPARATION. IT 
SEEMS ON THE SURFACE THAT MAKING THE XING RESTR IS SIMPLE ENOUGH. HOWEVER, MAKING 
THE FMS MAKE THE CHANGE THAT CLOSE IN TO THE FIX AND THEN FLY IN VNAV FOR THE REST OF 
THE ARR IS, WELL, VERY CHALLENGING TO SAY THE VERY LEAST. IT SEEMS EVEN THOUGH I NOTICED 
THE TOP OF DSCNT WAS PRIOR TO FOGOG, I FIGURED I COULD GET THE RESTR TYPED INTO THE 
FMS IN TIME. WHEN THE FMS DIDN'T ACCEPT MY INPUTS, I GOT OVERLY FOCUSED ON WHAT I 
MIGHT BE DOING WRONG THAT IT WOULDN'T ACCEPT MY INPUT. IN THE FUTURE, I RATHER 






AUTOTHROTTLES MALFUNCTIONED ON TKOF ROLL, RWY 18L CVG. TKOF WAS CONTINUOUS. IT 
WAS THE COPLT'S LEG, AND HE IS NEW (LESS THAN 2 MONTHS) ON THE ACFT. CLEAN-UP WAS 
NORMAL. I MADE 1 ATTEMPT TO RESET AUTOTHROTTLE SYS -- IT DID NOT RESET. TWR PASSED US 
TO APCH AS WE PASSED 5000 FT FOR 6000 FT INITIAL LEVELOFF. COPLT BEGAN LEVELOFF FOR 6000 
FT AND FAILED TO REDUCE PWR. HE LATER STATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE'D FLOWN 
WITHOUT AUTOTHROTTLE EXCEPT ON APCH. AT THE MOMENT, I NOTICED OUR SPD GOING 
THROUGH 280 KTS FAST APCH WAS GIVING US A CLB TO 8000 FT. I HEARD AND BELIEVE I REPEATED 
9000 FT. I SET 9000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW. WE WERE ON THE ROCKET DEP THAT HAD A HARD 
LEVELOFF AT 6000 FT. COPLT FOLLOWED COMMAND BARS FOR LEVELOFF, EVEN THOUGH WE 
WERE CLRED HIGHER. I WENT HEADS DOWN TO DELETE 6000 FT RESTR IN THE FMS. HE PULLED 
NOSE UP TO HELP BLEED SPD, NOW OVER 300 KTS. WE CLBED RAPIDLY TOWARD 9000 FT. ALL WAS 
WELL, SPD RETURNING TO NORMAL. AT 8400 FT DEP CALLED AND SAID 'ACR X, I SAID 8000 FT !' I 
REPEATED '8000 FT?' HE SAID '8000 FT.' COPLT PUSHED OVER TO RETURN TO 8000 FT. I SAW 8600-
8700 FT BEFORE WE STARTED DOWN. AS WE REACHED 8700 FT, ABOUT TO LEVEL OFF, DEP CLRED 
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